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Abstract
Differential privacy approaches employ a curator to control data sharing with
analysts without compromising individual privacy. The curator’s role is to guard
the data and determine what is appropriate for release using the parameter ε
to adjust the accuracy of the released data. A low ε value provides more privacy,
while a higher ε value is associated with higher accuracy. Counting queries,
which ”count” the number of items in a dataset that meet specific conditions,
impose additional restrictions on privacy protection. In particular, if the result-
ing counts are low, the data released is more specific and can lead to privacy
loss. This work addresses privacy challenges in single-attribute range queries
by proposing a Workload Partitioning Mechanism (WPM) which generates es-
timated answers based on query sensitivity. The mechanism is then extended
to handle multiple-attribute counting-range queries by preventing interrelated
attributes from revealing private information about individuals. Further, the
mechanism is paired with access control to improve system privacy and secu-
iii
iv
rity, thus illustrating its practicality. The work also extends the WPM to reduce
the error to be polylogarithmic in the sensitivity degree of the issued queries.
This thesis describes the research questions addressed by WPM to date, and
discusses future plans to expand the current research tasks toward developing
a more efficient mechanism for range queries.
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Analyses of personal data in diverse domains can lead to individual and societal
benefits; for example, in healthcare, personal data from the increasing use of fit-
ness trackers can provide medical researchers with the ability to learn from the
data to develop new treatment regimes. However, the availability of such data,
which includes personally identifying information (PII), can lead to significant
privacy loss. Even with aggregation and anonymization, the release of such
data to the public may allow adversaries to identify some individuals by linking
this data to auxiliary information from other public resources [36,46].
To address such possible privacy loss, Dwork et al. [19, 20, 23] proposed the
concept of differential privacy to permit the release of statistical information
from certain datasets while preserving participant privacy. Differential privacy
prevents adversaries from using other sources of information to learn about in-
dividuals from the data released by a differentially private model. This concept
requires the use of a trusted data curator who guards sensitive datasets and
releases statistical information about them while maintaining individual pri-
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
vacy. The data curator may receive analytical requests as counting queries and
produce estimated counts to answer these queries. The estimated counts can be
generated by injecting noise to the true counts; this noise is generated using the
parameter ε that controls the privacy of the released information. Generating
the appropriate amounts of noise also depends on the sensitivity of the released
data, which requires the curator to evaluate the given queries.
Statistical analyses can be performed based on counting queries by looking at
the count or proportion of items in a dataset that meet certain conditions. These
queries tend to be powerful and useful in statistical learning models [23]. How-
ever, they can also be a dangerous tool as they can expose individuals’ identity.
Many researchers have focused on this issues, and have proposed many differ-
entially private mechanisms to maintain both privacy and utility while answer-
ing counting queries. Range queries are a type of counting queries, which can
be answered by counting the dataset’s instances that fall inside a range (inter-
val). A number of non-interactive mechanisms were proposed to answer range
queries by preparing a summary of the underlying dataset used to answer un-
limited numbers of queries [13, 23]. However, designing a model that follows
this approach could be costly as all of the possible queries need to be considered
when preparing that summary. Interactive models can avoid such complexity
by only considering a set of queries that are given by the data analysts. So, the
differentially private responses to the given queries are processed while ensur-
ing that they do not reveal any information to identify individuals. However,
allowing unlimited numbers of queries over a sensitive dataset may allow the
full dataset to be reconstructed from the anonymized responses [48]. To avoid
this scenario, the number of allowed queries need to be limited, or the queries
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provided ahead of time as a complete workload. The mechanisms that use this
approach are called workload-aware mechanisms as they permit the data cu-
rator to evaluate the sensitivity of the given queries and adjust the responses
accordingly.
Range queries, which are the focus of this dissertation, can be answered
by building a histogram to represent the anonymized frequencies of the un-
derlying dataset. The question is: how can we anonymize these frequencies
while satisfying differential privacy? Dwork et al. [20], proposed a definition
of queries’ sensitivity to determine the amounts of noise that should be gener-
ated and added to anonymize their responses. In particular, the sensitivity of
a given query is measured by monitoring the changes of its response based on
the changes of the underlying dataset as discussed in Chapter 2. For example,
in case of representing the underlying dataset as a histogram, since performing
any change over the underlying dataset would affect only one frequency, there-
fore each frequency of the histogram should be injected with an amount of noise
that hasΘ(1) variance to satisfy differential privacy. Even though this approach
injects each frequency with a small amount of noise, there is an accuracy issue
while answering aggregated queries that cover large areas of the anonymized
histogram because of the accumulated amounts of noise involved in the total
count.
This inaccuracy encourages partitioning strategies that could enhance accu-
racy while answering the aggregated queries by partitioning the data domains
before performing the anonymization process. However, the mechanisms that
use this approach have some limitations due to their data dependencies or their
unsuitability for multiple-attribute queries. This has motivated us to design a
3
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partitioning strategy that is both data independent and can be used to handle
multiple-attribute range queries. Our proposed mechanism is workload-aware
because it partitions the data domain while considering the sensitivity of the
given workload. So, our first and second research questions (RQ) define re-
search tasks that verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism:
• RQ1: When does the Workload Partitioning Mechanism (WPM) provide
more accurate answers than the data dependent mechanisms?
• RQ2: How does WPM protect the privacy of datasets?
Our research tasks to answer RQ1 and RQ2 were completed, as described in
Chapter 3. Furthermore, this work is published in the Fifth IEEE International
Conference on Healthcare Informatics (ICHI 2017) [6]. The main contributions
of our work in this paper were:
• We studied the data-dependent partitioning strategies (DAWA) proposed
by Li at el. [33], and discovered opportunities to improve this algorithm.
Therefore, we designed a greedy algorithm that can produce an optimal
partition of the input vector of counts (histogram).
• We designed the Workload Partitioning Mechanism WPM that partitions
the input histogram based on the ranges given by the workload to ensure
privacy while providing a better estimation of the targeted counts.
• Our results showed that WPM can enhance both the utility and privacy
while answering range queries compared to the Laplace mechanism and
the data-dependent partitioning mechanisms.
• Based on our experimental findings, we defined new directions of our re-
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search work to study and improve the proposed mechanism while consider-
ing other essential factors to make it suitable for real-world systems.
Our work to answer RQ1 and RQ2 prompted another research question:
• RQ3: How can differential privacy be used to enhance privacy and security
in real-world systems?
Our research task to answer RQ3 is presented in Chapter 4. Also, this work
is published in the Twelfth IFIP Working Group 11.10 International Conference
on Critical Infrastructure Protection [4]. The main contributions of this work
were:
• We discussed privacy issues in real-world systems such as in the protection
of Critical Infrastructure (CI) systems.
• We proposed a prototype model that integrates access control with differ-
ential privacy to protect the security and privacy of the CI systems.
• We used Blockchain technology to implement the access control layer to
make the model more secure.
• We used WPM described in Chapter 3 for the differential privacy layer.
• We analyzed the efficiency of the proposed model in terms of complexity
and the needed time to finish the required processes.
• We identified directions for future work to improve the proposed model and
investigate its effectiveness in real-world systems.
Our research work on protecting CI systems brought up the need to secure
personally identifying information (PII) that cannot be fully protected using tra-
5
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ditional anonymization techniques. This recognition motivated us to formulate
our fourth research question:
• RQ4: How can WPM handle multiple-attribute range queries?
Our research to answer RQ4 is described in Chapter 5. This work was pub-
lished in the 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Home-
land Security (HST) [5]. We summarize the key contributions of this work here
as follows:
• We discussed the limitations of traditional anonymization techniques for
hiding Personal Identifying Information PII in real-world systems such as
CI systems.
• We extended WPM to handle multiple-attribute range queries to prevent
using the relationships between attributes to identify individuals.
• We provided an analysis of the proposed model’s complexity, privacy, and
utility. And, we showed that our proposed mechanism enhances the com-
plexity of the differentially private model comparing to current mecha-
nisms. Moreover, since the proposed mechanism is data-independent, it
produces more accurate estimations than the data-dependent mechanisms.
• We identified new research directions to improve the proposed mechanism
to handle other kinds of queries and to provide more accurate estimations
for some kinds of queries.
Our research work to answer RQ4 led us to identify a new problem that is
related to the sizes of the given workload and how they would affect the model
utility. Therefore, the next research task to solve this issue generated the fifth
and sixth research questions:
6
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• RQ5: How can the efficiency of WPM over the multi-dimensional datasets
be improved?
• RQ6: How do the sizes of workloads affect the accuracy of WPM results?
Our work to answer RQ5 and RQ6 is described in Chapter 6, and our contri-
butions are summarized as follows:
• We proposed MultiAttribute DisAssembly Mechanism MADAM, which is a
differentially private mechanism that can handle range queries over multi-
dimensional datasets more efficiently than WPM described in Chapter 3.
• We identified the factors that affect the accuracy of MADAM.
• We proposed BiMADAM a solution to enhance the accuracy of MADAM
while answering aggregated queries.
• We analyzed the error of our proposed mechanisms to show that BiMADAM
produces a tighter error while answering aggregated queries, as compared
to the Binary Mechanism [13].
• We evaluated both MADAM and BiMADAM empirically, and the obtained
results showed the effectiveness of using MADAM for applications with
dynamic datasets since it can preserve better privacy, utility, and efficiency.
In short, the primary focus of this dissertation was a privacy mechanism that
is data-independent, workload aware, and can be easily adopted to preserve
privacy in real-world systems. We proposed and implemented WPM, extended
this mechanism to MADAM and BiMADAM to address our goals.
The summary of our research questions follows:
7
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
• RQ1: When does the Workload Partitioning Mechanism (WPM) provide
more accurate answers than the data dependent mechanisms?
• RQ2: How does WPM protect the privacy of datasets?
• RQ3: How can differential privacy be used to enhance privacy and security
in real-world systems?
• RQ4: How can WPM handle multiple-attribute range queries?
• RQ5: How can the efficiency of WPM over the multi-dimensional datasets
be improved?
• RQ6: How do the sizes of workloads affect the accuracy of WPM results?
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
the background and literature review to place this dissertation in perspective.
Chapter 3 addresses RQ1 and RQ2 by proposing WPM and verifying its ef-
fectiveness over one-dimensional datasets. In Chapter 4, RQ3 is addressed
by proposing and implementing a solution to adapt WPM to preserve privacy
in real-world systems. Chapter 5 describes how WPM was improved to answer
RQ4 while Chapter 6 presents the work done to answer RQ5, and RQ6. Finally,




In this chapter, we provide the necessary background and review the related
work. We define differential privacy in Section 2.1, and counting queries in Sec-
tion 2.2. The focus of this thesis is range queries, a type of counting queries
that can be answered by counting the number of instances that fall inside a
range (an interval). In Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, we review the mechanisms
that can be used for range queries under differential privacy. Finally, we sum-
marize the more relevant differential private mechanisms that can be used for
range queries in Section 2.5. Furthermore, we provide a discussion of the cri-
teria that should be met while designing a differentially private mechanism for
range queries.
Note that this chapter only describes the fundamental background and pro-
vides the literature review to set the stage for a general understanding of differ-
ential privacy and how it can be used to preserve privacy while answering range
queries. That is, each subsequent chapter contains additional background that




For a finite data universe χ that is defined by a set of attributes, we can define
a dataset D ∈ χn to be an n-tuple (x1, x2, ...., xn) ∈ χ, where D is drawn from the
data universe χ. Let D′ be another data set that is drawn for the same data
universe χ, We consider both datasets D and D′ to be neighboring if they only
differ by one row.
Definition 2.1.1. (ε- Differential Privacy [20]). Let A : χn → R to be a ran-
domized algorithm. The algorithm A is ε- differentially private if for any two
neighboring datasets D and D′, and any vector of outputs O ∈R
Pr[A(D)=O]≤ eε.Pr[A(D′)=O]
As differential privacy was proposed to provide solutions for many statistical
purposes, we refer the reader to the monograph of Dwork and Roth [23] for a
deeper understanding of differential privacy and the aspects of its algorithms.
We review only the relevant basics of differential privacy.
Early work showed that differentially private release for a set of queries can
be obtained by adding an independent Laplace noise to the true answer of each
query. Here, a random variable Lap(b) is generated for the Laplace distribu-
tion with mean µ = 0, and scale b, where the probability density function is
f (x|µ,b)− 12b exp(−
|x−µ|
b ). To satisfy differential privacy, the scale b should be
chosen according to the sensitivity ∆ of the used function.
10
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Definition 2.1.2. (Sensitivity). Let f : χn → R be a function used to answers
a given query q, and D,D′ ∈ χn be neighboring datasets. While answering the
same query q, the sensitivity of the function f is
∆ f = max|| fq(D)− fq(D′)||
Proposition 2.1.1. (Laplace mechanism [20]). Let f be a function used to an-
swer any given query q, and let z be a sample from Laplace distribution with
scale (∆ f /ε), The Laplace Mechanism A produces a private answer to the query
q over the dataset D as follows:
A(D)= fq(D)+ z
As the differentially private mechanisms produce an approximation of the
true counts corresponding to the given range queries, their outcomes are evalu-
ated based on their usefulness or utility, which is formally defined next.
Definition 2.1.3. (Utility [13]). Let f be an algorithm that returns the true
count corresponding a range query q, the differentially private mechanism A is
(γ)-useful if for any query q over the dataset D, we have | fq(D)− Aq(D)≤ γ|
In some cases, a particular algorithm requires multiple differentially private
mechanisms to retrieve and process its private responses. Therefore, the follow-
ing composition theorems can be used to evaluate the produced responses.
Lemma 2.1.1. (Sequential composition theorem [38]) Let A1, A2, ..., Ak be
(ε1,ε2, ....εk)-differentially private mechanisms over the dataset D ∈ χn. If so, the





Lemma 2.1.2. (Parallel composition theorem [38]) Let A1, A2, ..., Ak be
ε-differentially private mechanisms. Let D1,D2, ...Dk ∈ χn be disjoint datasets.
Then the sequence release of A1(D1), A2(D2), ..., Ak(Dk) is ε-differentially private.
2.1.1 Approximate differential privacy
Differential privacy can be relaxed by incorporating a negligible statistical dis-
tance term δ to in addition to the parameter ε:
Definition 2.1.4. ((ε, δ)- Differential Privacy [20]). Let A : χn → R to be a ran-
domized algorithm. The algorithm A is (ε, δ)- differentially private if for any
two neighboring datasets D and D′, and any vector of outputs O ∈R
Pr[A(D)=O]≤ eεPr[A(D′)=O]+δ.
Here, δ is cryptographically negligible and is the upper bound on the prob-
ability of privacy loss (e.g., the entire sensitive dataset being publicly pub-
lished) [48]. This notation is called approximate differential privacy [10], in
contrast with pure differential privacy that is held by considering δ= 0 as given
by Definition 2.1.1. Our work throughout this thesis focuses on pure differen-
tial privacy that provides stronger privacy protection while answering range
queries.
2.2 Counting queries
Answering counting queries under differential privacy is one of the critical is-
sues that has interested many researchers recently. A counting query provides
the number of the records of a particular dataset that satisfy a certain condi-
tion. A counting query q on the universe χ can be defined by the predicate
12
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q : χ→ {0,1}. For the query q on a dataset D = (d1,d2, ...dn) ∈ χn, the answer to





This thesis mainly focuses on range queries (a type of counting queries). Also,
since a range query consists of a set of point queries, we define both point and
range queries as follows:
Definition 2.2.1. (Point queries [48]). For any data universe χ, and for any y ∈
χ, the point function qy : χ→ {0,1} is evaluated to 1 on only one element of the
data universe χ that matches the input y. So, for the dataset D = (d1,d2, ...dn) ∈
χn, the point function qy(di) = 1 iff y = di. Therefore, the point query over the





Definition 2.2.2. (Range queries). Let D ∈ χn be any dataset and a, b ∈ χ any
two numbers such that a < b. The query over the range [a,b] is the sum of the





2.3 Non-interactive mechanisms for range queries
Ever since differential privacy was proposed, many non-interactive mechanisms
have been developed to provide the needed statistical information to data ana-
lysts to conduct their studies. Dwork et al [20] proposed a method that produces
13
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an anonymized version of the frequency matrix that represents the frequency
distribution of the underlying dataset. Table 2.2 is an example of the frequency
matrix that represents a tiny dataset shown in Table 2.1.
To answer multiple-attribute range queries, the frequency matrix should
cover the whole dataset considering every possible combination of attributes’
values. Based on the example shown in Table 2.1, the first two cells of each row
in Table 2.2 represent a combination of the attributes’ values while the last cell
represents the count of the instances that satisfy that combination.
Dwork’s method satisfies differential privacy by anonymizing frequency ma-
trices by the addition of an independent amount of noise to each frequency. The
anonymized versions of frequency matrices are then released to answer unlim-
ited numbers of queries. This method guarantees the privacy of the released
data as each frequency is injected by noise with Θ(1) variance, which is con-
sidered to be sufficient as changing any record of the underlying dataset would
affect only one frequency by at most one. However, even though the amounts
of the injected noise are very small, an accuracy issue may arise for the aggre-
gated queries because of the accumulated noise involved in the differentially
private responses [50].
For example, if an aggregated query covers k entries, the returned response
is the sum of the frequencies corresponding to these entries. Therefore, to pre-
serve the privacy of the dataset, the released response would contain k amounts
of noise that indicates that the variance of the involved noise in the provided
response is about Θ(k). Hence, as k becomes larger, the differentially private
release becomes less accurate.
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2.3.1 Hierarchical aggregations for range queries
Many researchers developed hierarchical aggregations to release more accurate
estimations of frequency matrices [9,11,13,16,22,24,29,30,42,50,51]. This ap-
proach was first proposed by Hay et al. [29], and adapted by other researchers
to enhance their models’ accuracy. Barak et al. [9] generated the Fourier coef-
ficients of the input dataset and used the Laplace mechanism over these coeffi-
cients with linear programming to build contingency tables
Xiao et al. [50] proposed Privelet that uses wavelet transform to produce
more accurate versions of frequency matrices. A noticeable improvement of the
model’s accuracy was obtained by representing the frequencies of the underly-
ing dataset as a binary tree. So, the response of any range query is obtained as
a weighted sum of polylogarithmic of the number of the involved entries [50].
A similar approach was followed by transforming the dataset to the Fourier
domain to sample a noisy coefficient and map it back to a different dataset [2].
Dwork et al. [21] achieved a lower error for aggregated queries by propos-
15
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
ing the Tree Counter mechanism, which represents the underlying dataset as
a binary tree to allow arbitrary range queries to be answered more accurately.
Chan et al. followed a similar approach in the Binary Mechanism [13].
2.3.2 Partitioning strategies
Many partitioning strategies have been proposed recently to produce more accu-
rate versions of frequency matrices [2,16,17,22,30,32,51,52,53,54,55]. These
mechanisms aim to minimize noise in range queries’ responses by partition-
ing the histogram representing the underlying dataset before performing the
anonymization process.
Xiao et al. [52] developed a mechanism that constructs a partitioned kd-tree
based on the uniformity of the histogram’s frequencies. Inan et al. [30] also used
a partitioning strategy based on several tree structures, such as kd-tree, which
has been used in many other mechanisms for multi-dimensional datasets [16,
51].
Dwork et al. [22] proposed a mechanism that first reduces the dimensions of
the underlying dataset by partitioning the frequencies of each dimension based
on the number of the dataset’s entries and then builds a binary tree (the Tree
Counter [21]) over the partitioned dimensions. This mechanism could lower the
error of the obtained responses but the number of the the underlying dataset’s
entries should be smaller than the dataset’s dimensions to maintain the accu-
racy of the produced responses.
In general, data-dependent partitioning mechanisms face complexity issues
when the dimensions of the underlying datasets become larger. Furthermore,
complexity becomes even worse for the applications that work over a dynamic




Qardaji et al. [42] proposed HB, considered to be the best data independent
mechanism in terms of accuracy according to Hay et al. [28]. However, the
utility of HB depends on the domain size as it is only more accurate than the
Laplace Mechanism if the domain size is sufficiently large. The Binary Mecha-
nism [13] is more appropriate for applications that do not apply any constraints
on their datasets’ sizes. Therefore, this model was used in our experimental
analysis in Chapter 6.
2.4 Interactive mechanisms for range queries
Several works generate differentially private releases based on the given set
of queries (workloads) [26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 37]. Hardt et al. [27] attempted to
enhance the Laplace mechanism by examining the geometry shape for the in-
put workload [27]. For range queries, Hay et al. [29] refined the estimated
results that are generated by the Laplace mechanism using the correlation be-
tween the given queries. However, this mechanism is only applicable to one-
dimensional data. Li et al. proposed the Matrix Mechanism which answers
the given queries based on the noisy responses of another set of queries called
by the query strategy [34]. The accuracy of the results produced by this mech-
anism depends on the query strategy used to derive the noisy answers which
require complex processes to be generated according to Li et al. [33]. More-
over,the optimal query strategy cannot be generated for all kinds of workloads.
Also, this mechanism cannot handle multi-dimensional datasets. Li et al. [33]
improved the Matrix Mechanism through their Data-Aware/Workload-Aware
mechanism (DAWA) and combined it with a uniformity partitioning strategy.
17
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
The mechanism, however, is data-dependent and behaves like the partitioning
with Laplace mechanism [20] over some datasets.
McKenna et al. [37] proposed an improved version of a matrix mechanism
that provides an optimization approach for the error while answering range
queries over high-dimensional datasets. However, generating the optimal re-
sponse is not possible for some general large linear queries [1].
















2.5 The current mechanisms for range queries
We summarize the mechanisms that can be used to answer range queries in Ta-
ble 2.3. These mechanisms are categorized based on three criteria, data depen-
dency, workload awareness, and the ability to handle multiple-attribute range
queries. The data-independent mechanisms do not adopt the method of gener-
ating amounts of noise according to data distributions. Therefore, their utility
is not affected by the type of the underlying dataset.
The workload-aware mechanisms ensure better privacy because they gener-
ate their responses based on the sensitivity of the given workload. While these
18
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two criteria are met in the Matrix Mechanism [34] and WPM [6], there is no
mechanism that satisfies all three criteria because of the exponential growth
of the domain size as the number of the attributes becomes larger. To tackle
this complexity issue while answering multiple-attribute range queries, we pro-
posed MADAM to satisfy all three criteria, as described in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
An Adaptive Algorithm for Range
Queries
To answer range queries under differential privacy more accurately, partition-
ing strategies have been proposed in many mechanisms [2, 16, 17, 22, 30, 32,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55]. These mechanisms partition the data dimensions to mini-
mize the injected amounts of noise to obtain more accuracy while preparing
the differentially private response to a given set of queries. Li et al. [33] pro-
posed a partitioning mechanism that improved the accuracy of the produced
results compared to the state-of-the-art mechanisms by partitioning a given
vector of counts that represents the underlying dataset and using the Matrix
mechanism [34] to estimate the counts of the partitioned vector. After analyzing
the results provided in that paper, we found that over the partitioned vectors,
DAWA behaves similarly to the Laplace mechanism [20] that is considered to
be less complex than the Matrix mechanism used in DAWA. This observation
motivated us to formulate our first and second research questions.
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This chapter presents our work to answer the RQ1 and RQ2. We firstly
investigated the effectiveness of combining the Laplace mechanism with the
partitioning strategy proposed by Li et al. [33]. Moreover, we improved the par-
titioning algorithm that was proposed in the first stage of DAWA by developing
a greedy algorithm that can partition the input vector with O(n) complexity.
We also proposed a data-independent strategy that partitions the input vector
based on the ranges given by the workloads. To evaluate the effectiveness of
the proposed mechanism, we tested several datasets with workloads at differ-
ent sensitivity levels to study how data distributions and workload sensitivity
affects the accuracy of the produced results.
This work’s two main contributions are: (1) improving earlier work on par-
titioning mechanisms by building a greedy algorithm to partition the counts’
vector efficiently, and (2) presenting an adaptive algorithm that considers the
sensitivity of the given queries before providing results.
3.1 Data partitioning strategies
The data uniformity partitioning strategy takes a histogram representing a
particular dataset and partitions it into small buckets such that the counts
within each bucket are almost uniform. Then, the total count of each bucket
is estimated using one of the differentially private anonymization techniques
to generate a private histogram that can be used to answer range queries. For
instance, in DAWA [33], Li et al. proposed a partitioning strategy that gen-
erates a private histogram by estimating the count of each bucket using their
improved version of the Matrix mechanism [34]. Then, the estimated count is
split uniformly between the bucket’s frequencys. For example, for the given vec-
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Figure 3.1: An example of a vector of 10 frequencies to be partitioned into buckets using DAWA [33]
tor X of 10 elements, if the frequencies of X are = {2,3,7,2,1,2,5,5,4,8}, then,
a possible partition produced by DAWA is P where P = {B1,B2,B3,B4,B5} and
the intervals of these buckets are {[1,2], [3,3], [4,6], [7,9], [10,10]} respectively.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this process and shows the frequencies covered by each
bucket. So, the true counts of the produced buckets are Ct = {5,7,5,14,8} re-
spectively. Adding randomly generated noise to the buckets’ counts and split-
ting the estimated counts of each bucket uniformly among its frequencies would
produce the private vector shown in Figure 3.2 where X ′ = {2.85,2.85,7.2,1.6,
1.6,1.6,4.8,4.8,4.8,7.3}.
Based on the results of testing DAWA over many datasets and according to Li
et al. [33], performing the partitioning process over the counts’ vector plays a
significant role in enhancing the accuracy of DAWA. But the proposed algorithm
of the partitioning strategy used in DAWA firstly generates all possible parti-
tions and chooses the optimal one based on cost, as described in Section 3.1.1.
However, generating all possible partitions is too costly especially if the size of
the counts’ vector grows even though the authors emphasized that the running
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Figure 3.2: The vector shown in Figure 3.1 after partitioning it and estimating its frequencies.
time of computing all possible intervals can be reduced to O(T log2 T). To tackle
this issue, we propose our greedy algorithm that partitions the input vector
in roughly O(T) time, where T is the number of the vector’s frequencies. The
algorithm performs only one pass over the input vector to be partitioned. The
algorithm places the vector’s frequencies in the appropriate bucket based on the
changes in each bucket’s cost after adding or removing a particular frequency
to this bucket. Section 3.1.2 provides more details about the methodology to
produce the optimal partition of the input vector.
3.1.1 Bucket cost function
Partitioning the input vector requires having a function that returns the cost of
that partition, as discussed in Section 3.1.2. Therefore, we built a function that
is similar to the cost function used in DAWA [33]. Li et al. observed that after
the partition B = {b1, ...,bn} has been generated, an amount of noise z is added
so the count of the bucket bi is cti = bi(x)+zi. Then, as the counts of each bucket
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are split uniformly among its frequencies, the estimation of xr where r ∈ bi is:
yr = bi(x)|bi|
+ zi|bi|
The bucket size and the uniformity degree affect the accuracy of estimating
the bucket element xr. The element xr thus becomes close to the bucket’s mean
and the estimation of xr becomes more accurate [33]. The deviation of bucket






Choosing the buckets’ frequencies based on this deviation function will not
produce a good partition, as the deviation of a one-element bucket is less than
the deviation of the bucket that has many element unless the elements have
the same counts. In other words, using the deviation function alone to parti-
tion the input vector will put each frequency in a separate bucket and will not
involve the neighbor frequencies in the same bucket unless they have uniform
counts. Therefore, we need to specify the maximum difference between the fre-
quencies involved in one bucket. Also, since calculating the deviation of each
bucket requires the true bucket counts, these values should be anonymized by
adding Laplace noise to ensure no sensitive information is leaked, and then the
remaining processes applied over the anonymized counts to satisfy differential
privacy.
3.1.2 The greedy partitioning algorithm
Instead of generating all the possible partitions of the input vector and choos-
ing the optimal one as done in DAWA [33], Algorithm 1 is intended to reduce
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Algorithm 1 Data-based greedy algorithm for partitioning counts’ vector
1: procedure PARTITIONINGBYDATA(X , ε)
2: // let α be the maximum difference between X ’s frequencies involved in one bucket
3: // let firstFreq be the index of the current bucket’s first frequency




8: // if loop reaches last frequency of X
9: if lastFreq=The size of X then
10: currentp ← [ f irstFreq, lastFreq].
11: // add currentp to the partition
12: P ← P ∪ currentp.
13: // increase the last frequency
14: lastFreq ← lastFreq+1.
15: else
16: currentp ← [ f irstFreq, lastFreq].
17: nextp ← [ f irstFreq, lastFreq+1].
18: dev1 ←Deviation(currentp).
19: dev2 ←Deviation(nextp).
20: if dev1 +α< dev2 then
21: // add currentp to the partition
22: P ← P ∪ currentp.
23: // move to the next frequency
24: f irstFreq ← lastFreq+1.
25: else
26: // expand bucket by adding next frequency
27: lastFreq ← lastFreq+1.
28: if lastFreq <=The size of X then
29: goto loop.
30: // return the partition
31: return P
resources consumption. It starts building the private partition by the first fre-
quency and marks it as the current bucket. Then, another bucket will be gen-
erated by expanding the current bucket including the next frequency that is
marked as the candidate frequency. After that, the deviations of the two buck-
ets are calculated and the lower cost bucket is chosen to be the first bucket of
the partition. If the first bucket (that only has the first frequency in the first
round) is chosen, the next round starts by marking the previous candidate as
the current bucket and the next frequency as the new candidate for this round.
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On the other hand, if the second bucket costs less than the first one, the whole
second bucket will be marked as the current bucket and the same process will
continue until the last frequency of the vector. By reaching the last frequency of
the input vector, the private partition will be ready for the anonymization stage
to produce the differentially private vector.
3.2 The workload partitioning mechanism WPM
The data partitioning strategies may be affected by the distribution of the input
dataset. Therefore, some auxiliary information about the dataset distribution
may allow an adversary to issue a set of correlated queries and learn from their
private responses especially if the frequencies do not get efficient amounts of
noise. On the other hand, if the received queries cover large ranges or if the
ranges are unrelated to each other, these responses may involve large amounts
of noise that affects the quality of the produced results. Conversely, when a
set of queries with large ranges intersect, the focus must shift to small and
sensitive ranges, thus motivating the need for a mechanism to partition the
counts’ vector based on the given workload.
The Workload Partitioning Mechanism (WPM) [6] is proposed to reduce the
odds of exposing sensitive information using the relationships between a set of
queries and their noisy response. It takes a dataset represented as a vector of
counts with a workload of range queries (Figure 3.3 shows an example). Then,
the ranges of given queries are intersected to produce disjoint intervals that are
transformed into buckets in the produced partition. This method also focuses
on ranges that the given queries do not ask about, and puts them in additional
buckets. This approach is necessary because adversaries may not ask directly
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Figure 3.3: An example of a workload W with 5 queries.
about the regions of interest, but instead ask about neighboring regions and
use those counts to infer what they need. As these ranges become smaller, the
noise will be larger for each frequency that ensures the privacy of these regions.
Algorithm 2 describes how this proposed mechanism partitions a given vector
of counts based on a given workload.
WPM adds independent noise with variance Θ(1) to each bucket of the pro-
duced partition. So, each frequency within a bucket B gets that noise divided
by k where k is the number of the frequencies involved by B. In the worst case,
a bucket may have only one frequency so it would have independent noise with
variance Θ(1) and thus the results satisfy differential privacy. On the other
hand, if the input workload has larger ranges (insensitive), the produced parti-
tion would have larger buckets (larger k), so the added noise becomes smaller
since this noise is a small fraction of the total injected noise. Section 3.4 shows
how different workloads affect the accuracy of the produced answers.
3.2.1 Error function
To test the accuracy of the proposed approach, we implemented a function that
calculates the average error of the results produced to answer each given work-
load. We defined our error function as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. Workload error. For each query q in a given workload W , let
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Algorithm 2 The algorithm of the Workload Partitioning Mechanism WPM
1: procedure PARTITIONBYWORKLOAD(X , W)
2: for each query q ∈W do
3: // extract the range of the query q
4: r1, r2 ←ExtractTheRange(q).
5: // add the ranges to the frequencies matrix f reqs
6: f reqs ← f reqs+ (r1, r2).
7: // sort f reqs and delete the repeated elements
8: f reqs ←SortAndCheck( f reqs).
9: // construct interval ranges from f reqs
10: ranges ←ConstructRanges( f reqs).
11: // add the interval ranges to the partition
12: P ← ranges.
13: // return the partition
14: return P
rq be the true answer to q, pq be the private answer produced by mechanism
M to answer q, and n the number of the queries in W . The error of answering






The proposed methods were built to verify that partitioning increases dataset
privacy levels and the greedy algorithm produces a useful partition. In this sec-
tion, we present our examination of the ability of the partitioning mechanisms
to reach these goals. We used a real dataset of patients who were diagnosed
with cervical cancer [25].
The experiment measures and compares the efficiency of the two partitioning
mechanisms. Efficiency is usually measured based on factors such as time and
space complexity and results’ accuracy. The focus of this experiment was on the
results’ accuracy while ensuring dataset privacy. The accuracy of the produced
results was measured using workload error that was computed over each set of
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answers produced by each mechanism.
To test the partitioning performance, the Laplace mechanism was imple-
mented and compared with the two proposed strategies. The Laplace mecha-
nism produces a private vector by adding an amount of Laplace noise to each
frequency of the original vector. The three methods were run over two differ-
ent vectors to monitor the effectiveness of the data distribution on the accuracy
of the produced results. So, the first vector has many regions of density while
the second vector has large uniform regions. Figure 3.5 shows an example of
vectors that have many regions of density and Figure 3.6 shows an example of
vectors that have large uniform regions. To monitor and evaluate the resulting
privacy levels, the mechanisms are required to answer a set of workloads that
differ in their sensitivity levels. So, three different workloads were constructed
to be answered. Figure 3.4 shows examples of three workloads that differ in
their sensitivity levels: the first set (a) is very sensitive because most queries
ask about very small ranges; the second set (b) has some sensitive queries, and
the third set (c) has normal queries involving large ranges.
Figure 3.4: Three workloads organized by sensitivity levels: (a) very sensitive, (b) sensitive, and (c)
normal.
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Figure 3.5: A vector with many dense regions.
Figure 3.6: A vector with large uniform regions.
3.4 Results
Data-based partitioning strategy
The experiment shows that a vector with large uniform regions produces parti-
tions with fewer buckets than the number of the vector’s frequencies. However,
the vectors with many regions of density produce partitions with a number of
buckets that are very close to the number of the vector’s frequencies (example
of both kinds of vectors are shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6). As the number of
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the produced buckets goes down, the number of frequencies within each bucket
becomes larger. Therefore, the noise added to each frequency becomes smaller
as we generate one amount of noise for each bucket and split that between the
bucket’s frequencies. In other words, the reduction in the added noise means
that this approach produces more accurate answers. For example, in the sensi-
tive workload (b) of Figure 3.4 over the vector of Fig 3.6 the counts’ vector was
partitioned into four buckets, with each bucket having at least three frequen-
cies. So, the added noise to each frequency is divided at least by three, less than
if the bucket had only one frequency.
Figure 3.7 shows that this approach produces more accurate answers over
the vector that has large uniform regions (the age attribute) than over the
Laplace mechanism . However, Figure 3.8 shows that this approach performs
similarly to the Laplace method over the vectors that have many regions of den-
sity (the number of pregnancies attribute) because this mechanism produces a
vector that has a large number of buckets (very close to the number of the orig-
inal vectors’ frequencies) as shown in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.7: Error rates of answering three different workloads over the ’age’ attribute
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Figure 3.8: Error rates of answering three different workloads over the ’Number of pregnancies’ at-
tribute
Workload-based partitioning strategy
WPM typically performs better than other approaches as shown in Figure 3.7
and 3.8. Since this method depends on the nature of the workloads, its perfor-
mance changes according to the workload sensitivity level. So, as the workload
becomes more sensitive, the method produces less accurate results because sen-
sitive workloads have smaller ranges than normal workloads. Since each bucket
needs to be injected by a sufficient amount of noise, each frequency that is cov-
ered by a small bucket would have a large fraction of the injected noise, thus
increasing error rates to preserve more privacy. For example, workload (b) and
(c) shown in Figure 3.4 involve many ranges that are mostly small. As shown
in Figure 3.9, the partitions produced here have a number of buckets that is
close to the number of the vector’s frequencies. Since each produced bucket has
typically only one frequency, each frequency would have almost all the noise
generated for its bucket injected to its count. So, in the worst-case scenario
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when the given workload involves sensitive queries, WPM would behave sim-
ilarly to the Laplace mechanism to preserve the privacy over the underlying
dataset.
Figure 3.9: True and private vectors produced by each mechanism to answer a sensitive workload over
the ’Number of pregnancies’ attribute
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Figure 3.10: True and private vectors produced by each mechanism to answer a sensitive workload over
the ’age’ attribute
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we aimed to answer RQ1: When does the Workload Partition-
ing Mechanism (WPM) provide more accurate answers than the data
dependent mechanisms?. We tested both mechanisms based on the utility of
their responses to different sets of range queries. The data partitioning mecha-
nism typically reduces error rates unless the vector has many regions of density
contributing to partitions with many buckets and large amounts of noise. On
the other hand, the distribution of the underlying dataset does not affect the
utility of WPM.
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This study also attempts to answer RQ2: How does WPM protect the
privacy of datasets?. Therefore, we evaluated both mechanisms over many
workload with different sensitivity levels showing that WPM error rates are
typically smaller than other mechanisms unless the given workload involves
many sensitive regions. Initial experimentation shows that WPM outperforms
other methods due to data independence and control over the anonymization
level.
Finally, this work was published in the Fifth IEEE International Conference
on Healthcare Informatics (ICHI 2017) [6].
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Differential Privacy and Access
Control
In Chapter 3, we studied the effectiveness of one of the data based partition-
ing strategies (the first stage of DAWA [33]) on both of the accuracy and pri-
vacy while answering a given set of range queries under differential privacy.
Moreover, we presented and discussed WPM, that was proposed to enhance the
privacy of the produced responses while maintaining their usefulness. In this
chapter, we present our work to answer the RQ3: How can differential pri-
vacy be used to enhance privacy and security in real-world systems? by
proposing a novel approach that integrates existing access control mechanisms
with blockchain and differential privacy.
For this research task, we chose critical infrastructure systems as an exam-
ple for real-world systems since they are considered to be very rich resources
of data that can be valuable for conducting useful statistical analysis and per-
forming many crucial studies. Moreover, the stored data in the critical infras-
tructure systems include personally identifiable information (PII) that leads to
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identifying individuals. For instance, in the healthcare sector, epidemiologists
need to analyze PII-containing data to track the spread of diseases, or regional
emergency managers need to be able to view details of all 911 calls during a
hurricane or terrorist incident. Even though some models have been proposed
to mask the obvious PII, such as k-anonymity or l -diversity, researchers found
that these models cannot safeguard PII from either inadvertent or malicious
exposure. Moreover, recent data breaches in critical infrastructure settings il-
lustrate that current access control mechanisms, such as the commonly used
Role-based Access Control, are insufficient to provide the required data protec-
tion needed to prevent loss of privacy. In this chapter, we address this short-
coming and show how differential privacy can be used to protect individuals’
data stored in the critical infrastructure systems.
4.1 Problem definition
Sensitive datasets, such as data generated by critical infrastructure (CI) assets,
often need to be analyzed to recognize trends, optimize resources, and determine
proper courses of action. However, CI data typically includes a great deal of
personal identifying information (PII) in addition to other sensitive attributes
such as location, building access, perimeter security, and so on. Based on their
data needs, analysts can be categorized as:
1. Primary Analysts. These users must have complete access to all of the CI
data and related data products to perform their duties. For example, the
emergency manager in a US county may need to see the details of every
call to that county’s 911 system.
2. Secondary Analysts. These users may need access to CI data that in-
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cludes some PII and/or sensitive information, but the rest of the data can
be restricted through aggregation or anonymization. For example, an em-
ployee in a different agency, analyzing resource allocation for the county,
only needs to see aggregated information from this same dataset with most
PII removed, but may need access to location information that can inher-
ently become PII in sparsely populated areas of the county.
3. Tertiary Analysts. These users do not have the need to see any PII infor-
mation, but might need access to aggregated or anonymized information.
For example, a member of the local news media should not have access to
any sensitive information but may see summary data.
The dilemma then is to ensure maximal protection for CI data while provid-
ing appropriate access to legitimate uses by the three different kinds of data
analysts. In all of these cases, system access is to be permitted but controlled.
Current access control methods have been proven to be inadequate for sen-
sitive datasets. Based on tracking by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, over
550 data breaches were publicly reported in 2017; that is, more than 1.5 data
breaches occurred daily on average in 2017 in the US [15]. As these are merely
reported and recorded events, the actual number of data breaches is likely to be
a lot higher. In many of these cases, the breach was caused by inadequate access
control mechanisms used by the system, which essentially allowed outsiders or
insiders to breach them fairly easily.
Access control mechanisms thus need to be enhanced to provide better data
security and protection. This work also argues that access control needs to
be used as merely the first layer of protection to limit what users can see. A
logical next layer is anonymizing the data, for example, ranges can obscure sen-
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sitive values, and concept hierarchies can mask specific attributes. However,
most techniques such as k-anonymity and l-diversity cannot prevent exposure
of private information through querying the data [36]. As anonymization is not
sufficient, we believe that there is a crucial role for differential privacy [57] in
overall data protection. Differential privacy makes the presence or absence of
an individual or single entity indistinguishable, thus reducing any benefit of
adversarial background knowledge about individuals’ data in the dataset. For
instance, Lin et al. [35] propose an approach that adds random noise to true
answers, but even that method is not foolproof If attackers repeatedly ask the
same question and every time the output is a different answer, that alone is a
clue that the information is sensitive. Complicating this situation is the real-
ity that real-world data is not independent, thus requiring any comprehensive
strategy to consider the correlation between attributes [56].
4.2 Motivating scenarios
The following examples illustrate how the methodology would be applied to dif-
ferent domains. We choose emergency management and healthcare as sample
domains, although similar scenarios can be developed for all other critical in-
frastructure domains. While the easiest way to safeguard data is to completely
restrict it, we consider an analysis of these datasets to be beneficial activities
as long as privacy and sensitive data is protected.
4.2.1 Scenario 1: Emergency services sector
Emergency response in the United States is typically handled at the municipal
level (town, village, city) until an event overwhelms the local resources [44].
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At this point, the emergency response is managed at the county level at an
emergency operations center. Data related to the emergency event is collected
by the countywide 911 system and other repositories such as after-action re-
ports. These data sources are often used for analysis to identify ways munic-
ipalities can optimize resource allocation, merge or move fire/police stations,
or even suggest changes to intersections to minimize accidents. However, the
data—particularly 911 data—contains personal identifying information such as
names, addresses, phone numbers, driver’s license numbers, medical status,
and other sensitive data for both individuals and businesses.
For the purposes of this example, we will consider the three user roles de-
scribed in Section 4.1. Here, the primary analysts are the county emergency
manager and municipal department heads. The secondary analysts are the
county or municipal personnel analyzing broad event patterns that affect re-
source usages such as arsons, accidents, or even emergency medical calls. These
analyses do not require, and should not contain, PII, but would have specific
event location information and response unit identification data. Finally, the
tertiary internal or external users would include lower-level municipal em-
ployees or university researchers performing high-level analyses. These users
would not have access to PII, specific event locations, or response unit identi-
fiers beyond the type of response unit (police, fire, emergency medical units).
A more detailed version of this scenario assigns different roles to a user de-
pending on their position; for example, the county emergency manager should
have access to all data regardless of jurisdiction, but a town official may not
be granted unrestricted access to data outside the official’s municipality. Alter-
nately, an attribute-based control system could accomplish the same purpose.
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The benefit of using our framework in this scenario is tighter access control
over individuals’ private data and sensitive information for businesses or gov-
ernment entities. Since many government data sources are subject to “Freedom
of Information” type requests, the differential privacy aspect of our framework
allows external users access while protecting critical assets. Safeguarding PII
is important, but it is just as critical to avoid breaches that might expose a
business or government installation vulnerability.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: Healthcare sector
In the healthcare sector, information sharing has become crucial for improving
healthcare quality and outcomes, as well as lowering costs [41]. The benefits of
sharing information need to be balanced with security and privacy concerns, es-
pecially when healthcare PII is involved. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) places strict requirements, such as access control,
for the protection of healthcare PII [47]. The constant barrage of successful
attacks in this sector and consequent data breaches reveal that currently de-
ployed access control mechanisms are inadequate [14] and cost healthcare or-
ganizations in significant penalties for one-time violations and repeat violations
across all HIPAA violation categories [49].
Consider a scenario similar to the emergency management discussed above.
Here, we have trusted internal users (doctors, nurse practitioners, and other
medical personnel involved in the direct care of a patient); internal users (med-
ical personnel not involved in direct patient care); and internal/external users
such as administrative personnel and researchers. However, a healthcare set-
ting includes aspects that make this scenario more complex.
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Primary analysts have access to all information about a patient under their
care. Unlike the emergency management scenario, in a healthcare setting the
doctor/patient relationship excludes the possibility of a trusted user with unre-
stricted access to all data on all patients.
Secondary analysts such as medical technicians would have access to data
about their particular function for a short period. While one would expect the
doctor/patient relationship to be ongoing, ancillary medical personnel and even
floor nurses do not need to access patient data once the person is out of their
care.
Tertiary analysts in medical administration need not see detailed health
data, such as lab reports or nursing notes. As they do need to know diagnoses
and insurance information, they should have access to PII. External analysts,
such as medical researchers, have no need to see PII. Given the complexity of
the healthcare scenario, attribute-based access control (ABAC) seems to be a
better fit than role-based access control (RBAC) [8]. An ABAC approach would
account for the temporal aspects of this domain.
In short, the privacy requirements alongside increasing information sharing
in the healthcare sector provide another compelling motivator for the enhanced
access control proposed in this chapter.
4.3 Background
This section provides the background needed to understand the proposed frame-
work and methodology. The basic ideas of access control, blockchain, and differ-
ential privacy are presented to set the stage for the rest of this chapter.
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4.3.1 Access control
Access control models are used to ensure that only authorized users are allowed
to perform previously-approved operations on objects. Different access control
models have been developed over the years to secure systems, with each having
its pluses and minuses. Of the different access control models, software systems
typically used across critical infrastructure sectors tend to use some variant of
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [7,43].
RBAC is based on five sets: subjects, objects, roles, operations, and permis-
sions; and two relations: subject-to-role assignment and permission-to-role as-
signment. Central to RBAC is the role concept, which specifies an organiza-
tional job function. Each role can also represent a set of responsibilities (or op-
erations) associated with its job function. In RBAC, instead of granting permis-
sions individually to each subject, permissions are first associated with roles,
and then roles assigned to subjects based on their particular job functions. Its
strengths come from its simplicity of authorization administration and support
for developing secure systems without requiring actual subjects. As RBAC is
a static model, its access logic relies on a predefined set of associations of per-
missions to roles, which makes it unsuitable for dynamically changing envi-
ronments and sectors; it also has inadequate protections against information
disclosure and modification [7]. While security researchers and NIST in recent
years have proposed such models as Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
to address RBAC’s problems, these models have yet to gain widespread accep-
tance, and RBAC continues to be the dominant model used in critical infras-
tructure systems [43].
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4.3.2 Blockchain
Decentralized and cryptographically secure, blockchain serves as an immutable
public ledger that is a collection of records linked to one another [40]. Each block
in the blockchain is a collection of transactions; for example, a block might
contain a set of financial transactions used for cryptocurrencies. In a typical
blockchain architecture, the blocks are linked to one another using hashing. All
transactions are digitally signed by the parties involved with their private key,
and anyone can verify the owner, using the owner’s public key. For cryptocur-
rencies such as bitcoin, transaction linkage also helps to keep track of the par-
ticipants’ balances. Each transaction is broadcast across the network and can
be validated by each node within the network; nodes not in the network do not
have permission to broadcast blocks. Transactions are grouped together to form
a block that is broadcast across the network. Once the entire network validates
the block with the chosen consensus algorithm establishing an agreement, the
block is added to the blockchain by all nodes locally. This action results in all
network nodes containing the same consistent data in the form of these linked
blocks forming a blockchain without any central authority. Any external node
that wants to join the network can build the blocks from the starting block to
the most recent one with the help of its peers.
Smart contracts are often used in blockchain technology; these elements are
executable code where any logic can be applied on all the nodes in the net-
work [12]. In our application, the smart contract contains the user information
(roles and attributes) needed by the access control system.
Blockchain provides a decentralized method of enforcing the rules and poli-
cies to all the nodes in the network, makes sure that all the nodes follow and
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agree on the decisions, and maintains consistency of the data. Traditionally,
access control systems were centralized, with a single point of failure affecting
and compromising the whole system, but Blockchain has no point of failure.
Blockchain technology has been used to secure data and its privacy [57], and is
generally used to store access permission information.
4.3.3 Differential privacy
Differential privacy aims to make the presence of an individual indistinguish-
able, regardless of the background knowledge adversaries might have about the
dataset containing these individuals’ data. Thus, applying any analysis over the
dataset gives almost the same results when adding or removing any record from
this dataset [3]. The necessary background about differential privacy is given
in Chapter 2.
Counting queries require an aggregating function to retrieve a specific value
(count) of records that satisfy certain conditions. Answers to these queries could
exacerbate individuals’ loss of privacy [23]. As interactive settings provide bet-
ter privacy than non-interactive settings, user access to data can be limited
dynamically.
An unlimited number of sequential queries could still result in leaking sen-
sitive information, especially when they operate over related attributes. How-
ever, this issue could be resolved by setting up a workload of queries ahead
of time and submitting as a batch to adjust the level of added noise based on
these given queries. WPM permits sensitive areas of the counts’ vector to have
larger amounts of noise than the others. Doing so helps to ensure more accu-
rate answers can be retained when the given workload has insensitive queries.
This mechanism thus considers the sensitivity of the given set of queries, but
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otherwise is data independent. More information about WPM is provided in
Chapter 3.
4.4 Design and implementation
This section outlines the proposed framework to enhance access control using
Blockchain and differential privacy.
4.4.1 System architecture
The proposed model assumes an RBAC model with three major roles: Primary,
Secondary, and Tertiary, which correspond to the three kinds of analysts men-
tioned in Section 4.1. Other access control models are also possible, but RBAC
is sufficient for the purposes here. To address the goal of protecting sensitive
information, the framework uses layered access, as shown in Figure 4.1. Each
layer receives input queries from the previous (higher in the figure) layer and
invokes the appropriate access policy depending on the analyst’s role.
The system consists of the following layers and components:
1. Client layer. The client layer accepts queries from the different types
of analysts, and passes those queries, along with user credentials, to the
access control layer.
2. Access control layer. The access control layer is responsible for granting
access to the requested data. This layer is implemented using blockchain,
where each user/node will initiate a transaction on the blockchain network.
This transaction will be initiated once the smart contract is executed by the
client layer. Based on the inputs provided to the smart contract, the user
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of the proposed system
will be provided with appropriate access permissions to complete the trans-
action. The smart contract will run on all nodes trying to gain access to the
data tables. The block is then broadcast across the blockchain network; all
nodes will validate the block, come to an agreement based on the consensus
algorithm chosen, and add the block to the blockchain.
The smart contract code cannot be modified by any of the users and the
logic will inevitably get executed once the user tries to access the data. The
access control system leverages blockchain technology and smart contracts
for granting access securely, returning the key used to execute the queries.
The main advantage of using smart contracts is that any complex access
permission logic can be coded easily.
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3. Differential privacy layer. This component is responsible for imple-
menting differential privacy techniques to provide further protection to
sensitive information. For secondary and tertiary analysts, the access con-
trol layer will require users to provide all of their queries as a workload
and then invoke the differential privacy layer. Based on the given work-
load of queries, actual results will be modified to ensure individuals’ and
operational privacy, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
4.4.2 Queries by different types of analysts
For primary analysts, the initial access layer works in a pass-through mode,
that is, it simply passes the query straight to the raw database without any
processing; this path is depicted on the left side of Figure 4.1. For secondary an-
alysts, differential privacy techniques may be invoked depending on the nature
of the query, that is, whether it includes sensitive attributes or combinations
of such attributes. If no sensitive attributes are present, the query becomes
passthrough like for primary analysts. This path is depicted in the middle of
Figure 4.1. For tertiary users, as depicted on the right side of Figure 4.1, the
differential privacy layer is always used.
4.4.3 Implementation details
Based on the architecture shown in Figure 4.1, we implemented RBAC using
the Ethereum Blockchain [12], with analyst roles stored in a smart contract.
Analysts interact with the system via a public address to issue queries. The
client layer receives the analyst’s public address and then executes a call to the
smart contract. The smart contract returns the analyst’s role if access to be
granted, otherwise denies access.
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Figure 4.2: Single block example of smart contract interaction with access control
Figure 4.2 illustrates the access control mechanism using a single transac-
tion in a block. The analyst’s address is input for the transaction and will be
used by the access control logic in the smart contract to look up and return an
appropriate access token for that analyst. The access token (No access, Tertiary
access, Secondary access, or Primary access) returned from the smart contract
will be the transaction output and will be stored with the issuing analyst’s ad-
dress in a block.
Assuming the access control layer approves, the client layer request will be
either sent directly to the data repository (primary analysts) or passed through
the differential privacy module (secondary and tertiary analysts). Of course,
users who are not legitimate analysts for the system will be denied access.
As stated earlier, whenever the differential privacy module is invoked, the
system requires the analysts to present all queries in one single batch or work-
load. For this module, we used WPM described in earlier work [6]. WPM takes
the provided set of queries as a workload, along with the attribute values repre-
49
CHAPTER 4. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND ACCESS CONTROL
sented as a vector of counts. The vector is then partitioned into buckets based on
the ranges of the given queries, and the total count of each bucket is anonymized
by adding an amount of noise drawn from a Laplace distribution. Once the
count of each bucket is anonymized, it will be split uniformly between the vec-
tor positions, producing a different private vector to be used for answering the
given queries. The results, which are then returned to the user via the client
layer, provided additional privacy.
4.4.4 Preliminary analysis
The proposed generic prototype can be used to implement various access control
models provided that the access control logic of the models can be programmed
in the smart contract. Blockchain technology, coupled with differential privacy,
provides added protection for sensitive data.
However, as in most things, the extra protection comes with a cost—in this
case, additional overhead from the system components. First, the efficiency of
the system is influenced by the complexity of the access control logic for the
selected access control model. Depending on the application, the access control
logic chosen and implemented can vary from simple to complex and execution
time overhead also varies accordingly.
Second, by requiring each node to process a transaction, blockchain can slow
a system and may not be scalable [39]. In addition, the underlying distributed
blockchain network parameters such as network load, consensus mechanism,
the processing power of the nodes, number of nodes, and other distributed net-
work parameters also affect the performance of the system. Figure 4.3 shows
the possible impact of access policies and blockchain overhead on processing
time.
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Figure 4.3: Effects of access control policies and blockchain on processing time
Third, using differential privacy may also affect performance because of the
processes that must be performed until the final answers are returned to the
user. However, in this system differential privacy is not universally invoked for
all users.
Other concerns with the proposed framework regarding security and privacy
include:
1. The access control logic in the smart contract, once deployed, cannot be
modified. The smart contract code needs to be foolproof with no bugs and
other programming flaws. If there are any issues, an adversary may be able
to view the smart contract code and exploit any programmed code flaws.
2. The data stored on the blockchain is visible to all the nodes in the network
and any node can view the access permission of another node, leading to a
possible privacy issue. However, since the analyst’s address will be stored
with their access permissions, the system creates new addresses each time
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a user query is sent to our system, thus precluding blockchain users from
breaching analyst privacy. We are investigating the possible impact of scale
on our approach.
3. In the proposed system, only the access permission details are stored on the
blockchain, and not the real data. The application that uses our system has
to make sure that the user, who wants to gain access, must interact with
the access control system to get the access permission and no adversary
is allowed to circumvent the access control system. The blockchain also
makes sure that no unauthorized user can initiate a transaction or can
change any data on the ledger.
4. The heart of the blockchain mechanism is the consensus mechanism. That
is, if more than half (i.e., 51% and above) of the network nodes are not
trustworthy—a very rare scenario—then there is a chance that adversaries
might be able to take over the system.
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, we answered the RQ3: How can differential privacy be used
to enhance privacy and security in real-world systems? by proposing a
prototype that integrates existing access control mechanisms with blockchain
and differential privacy. The proposed framework allows effective information
sharing, decision-making, and allocation since these critical precursors are nec-
essary to an effective response, particularly under conditions of widespread
stress and overwhelming need. Even in these precarious times, it is important
to protect individual, collective and perhaps operational privacy and security
for critical infrastructure assets. Many current information-sharing systems
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depend upon outmoded controls that provide little certainty, and present trade-
offs between responsiveness and access control.
Our proposed framework addresses these fundamental concerns while sup-
porting optimal decision making in evolving environments. However, a thor-
ough exploration of this layered approach requires systematic testing and pa-
rameter optimization. Since questions remain about the scalability of the sys-
tem and possible vulnerabilities, performing prototype testing under a range of
parameter settings while using real datasets would provide a clear vision about
the effectiveness of the proposed model in real-world systems.
Finally, this work was published in the Twelfth IFIP Working Group 11.10
International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection [4].
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Differential Privacy for Protecting
PII
In Chapter 4, we showed how differential privacy can be used to maintain
privacy in real-world systems such as critical infrastructure systems. How-
ever, the critical infrastructure (CI) sectors such as emergency management
or healthcare store data that contains personally identifiable information (PII)
that needs to be safeguarded for legal and ethical reasons. Differential privacy
can be used in these systems to support individual privacy while allowing the
analysis of datasets for societal benefit since the traditional techniques for safe-
guarding, such as anonymization, have shown to be ineffective. Therefore, there
should be a differentially private mechanism that can handle multiple-attribute
range queries since they are more powerful and can assist researchers to ana-
lyze and detect useful patterns in data.
In this chapter, we answer the RQ4: How can WPM handle multiple-
attribute range queries? by extending WPM to answer multiple-attribute
range queries since this mechanism is data-independent, and can provide better
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protection for privacy than current differential privacy approaches.
5.1 Problem definition
Analyzing critical infrastructure data can potentially lead to a variety of societal
benefits but also comes with legal and ethical problems because such data typ-
ically contains personally identifiable information (PII). In the US healthcare
sector, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) places
strict requirements for protecting such information [47]. In the case of 911 calls,
such data can include PII involving healthcare data too (for example, "a caller
may have reported a cardiac emergency" or report a sensitive event such as a
domestic violence situation). Obscuring methods are applied to such datasets
typically during data cleaning and preparation to mask key identifiers, quasi-
identifiers, and other types of sensitive data and generate a separate, cleaned
dataset for mining [31]. However, this dataset may still, when analyzed using
different feature sets, expose sensitive PII [45].
Even when the access to a particular dataset is restricted, adversaries may
be able to reconstruct some parts of the sensitive data using a sequence of range
queries. Multiple-attribute range queries could be more dangerous because they
can be used to target small fractions of individuals’ data using unique attribute
values that have been known or obtained from public resources. For example,
shingles disease is unlikely to be found in adults under 60 years old. Suppose
an adversarial actor accesses a particular dataset containing health data of a
31 year-old woman that is known to him, and he wants to know if this woman is
diagnosed with shingles. Using the answers of a set of correlated range queries
can easily answer his question. For instance, assuming the hidden dataset is
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Table 5.1: An anonymized patient dataset
ID Gender Age Disease
1 M [25,35] Flu
2 F [55,100] Flu
3 F [25,35] Shingles
4 M [45,55] Bronchitis
5 M [55,100] Shingles
the one that shown in table 5.1, the adversary may ask firstly about the number
of females who are between 30 and 40 years. Based on this dataset, the answer
is 1–which indicates that the targeted woman is the only one who satisfies this
condition. So, based on this response, his second query will be ’How many fe-
males are in the dataset in the age between 30 and 40, and are diagnosed with
’Shingles’. The response of 1 would verify that the targeted woman has been
diagnosed with this disease. Thus, the sequential queries, coupled with some
already known data, expose this patient’s private information.
Differential privacy models seem to be more effective at preventing PII ex-
posure while maintaining dataset utility [19], including in the healthcare sec-
tor [18]. These models preserve individual privacy while considering back-
ground knowledge that adversaries may possess; for instance, anyone who can
query the dataset may be able to learn sensitive information about individuals.
Another difference stems from the kind of interaction researchers have with
datasets. Traditional techniques for privacy preservation, such as anonymizing
datasets and releasing them for analysis, are fundamentally non-interactive.
Differential privacy, however, can be applied to be an interactive model, which
is a more realistic scenario that restricts data usage and provides more privacy
than a non-interactive setting while providing more accurate analysis of the
datasets.
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This chapter discusses how differential privacy can be used in CI sectors and
introduces an interactive mechanism that can be incorporated with infrastruc-
ture systems to obscure PII while making their data available for the use of
statistical analysis.
5.2 Motivation
Although PII is present in data used or generated in every CI sector, this section
explores PII in two sectors–emergency management and healthcare–to show
that current anonymization does not protect individual privacy, thus motivating
the use of differential privacy for protecting PII in data.
PII in 911 data
Emergency calls contain PII in several different forms. While we automatically
assume PII is present in 911 calls that result in ambulance dispatch, other
types of calls also expose personal information. For example, a traffic accident,
even without injuries, captures a person’s name, address, driver’s license num-
ber, phone number, and insurance carrier. Fire emergencies expose the person’s
name, address, and medical information about injuries sustained by the resi-
dents. Even security checks on industrial buildings contain names and phone
numbers of the building’s owner or caretaker. PII about first responders are also
included in these records: for example, beats, badge numbers, and workplaces
of the police officers, EMTs, and firemen are often included in the full tran-
script of an event. Eliminating or obscuring PII in these records is difficult to
automate due to the variety of ways used to record this information. Figure 5.1
shows a part of the data that have been collected from 911 calls. Observe that
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the obvious PII such as names, phone numbers, and addresses were removed
from this dataset snippet. However, releasing other information may still ex-
pose individual PII. For instance, the combination of code (which is the category
of emergency) and lat/long can expose specific neighborhoods or even homes, as
in the domestic violence call in the third record.
Figure 5.1: Part of a dataset collected from 911 calls. PII is represented by the symbol *
PII in healthcare data
In addition to the pieces of PII mentioned above (e.g., name, address, phone
number, social security number, or insurance carrier), healthcare data may
include other identifying information such as biometrics (fingerprints, retina
scan, voice signature, facial geometry) or x-rays. It may also include the date
of birth, weight, activity levels, information about specific health conditions,
medical history, and prescribed medications. Sometimes, individual pieces of
information might seem harmless on their own, but in combination with other
types of data, they can compromise the privacy of an individual.
Alnemari et al. [6] provide a motivating example that shows patient privacy
is easily lost based on queries that can uniquely identify a patient with a certain
disease, even if their names are anonymized. With access to other databases or
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attacker knowledge, the individual will be totally identified. The paper also
shows that range searches on anonymized data can reduce privacy loss but not
remove it altogether. The paper uses a dataset of patients who were diagnosed
with ’cervical cancer’ [25] as an example of these privacy issues. Even though
this dataset has more than 800 records, an adversary can easily find unique
records by querying the ’age’, and the ’number of pregnancies’ attributes. For
example, only one record each matched the ’age’ attribute for values of 13, 79,
and 84. So, with some additional background about the dataset, such as the
name of the hospital that provided this data, an adversary could identify the
individuals satisfying these values even though age is not an obviously sensitive
attribute.
5.3 Using differential privacy for protecting PII in critical in-
frastructure data
CI systems are built over databases that contain different kinds of data. Al-
though most of these systems restrict PII access, some parts of the data are
considered to be insensitive and may be released with no access constraints. At
the same time, with auxiliary information that is known to an adversary about
the underlying dataset, the released parts of the dataset may lead to individual
data loss. Differential privacy over data with no obvious PII may contribute to
the preservation of individual privacy. Unlike traditional anonymization tech-
niques, differential privacy does not perform any change over the original data
to hide individual data. Instead, differential privacy models generate or re-
turn statistical summaries about the underlying dataset such as, for example,
anonymized histograms that represent the frequencies of each attribute. More-
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over, this approach can be implemented to work interactively while preserving
needed privacy for individual data by allowing data analysts to provide their
statistical queries and returning answers after ensuring that no sensitive infor-
mation is revealed.
Our proposed mechanism can be used over CI databases to enable data an-
alysts to interact with these databases and obtain the information needed to
conduct their studies. Data analysts must prepare their requests as a work-
load of range queries and give it to our mechanism. Based on the sensitivity
of the given queries, the mechanism performs the needed anonymization over
the actual response and returns it back to the analyst. Our proposed mecha-
nism is effective for CI databases, as it does not require data storage for private
information that gets updated often. Moreover, the responses do not require
performing a complex set of operations as do other interactive mechanisms.
5.4 WPM for multi-dimensional datasets
In this section, we discuss an extension to WPM [6] that takes a workload
of range queries and anonymizes their responses based on their sensitivity.
The mechanism identifies the sensitive areas of the data distribution from the
ranges of the given queries. Then, the frequencies within these areas are in-
jected with sufficient noise to ensure individual privacy. So, this strategy con-
tributes to enhance utility of the produced results [6].
Multiple-attribute range queries are more useful for analysts since they cap-
ture the relationships between attributes values and those relationships help
to discover significant contributing factors. However, adapting WPM to han-
dle multiple-attribute range queries is likely to be prohibitive since the mech-
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anism works over a histogram representing the underlying dataset as the size
of the required histogram grows exponentially by the dataset dimensions. A
multiple-attribute histogram would have
∏d
i=1 Ti records where d is the num-
ber of attributes and Ti is the number of values that attribute i can take. Many
researchers have developed models to handle multiple-attribute range range
queries [13,22,52]. However, these models also suffer from the curse of dimen-
sionality, where the histogram size increases exponentially as the number of
attributes increases. To tackle this issue, we propose a mechanism that han-
dles multiple-attribute range queries without the need to build a full histogram
to represent the underlying dataset.
Our proposed mechanism takes the workload first and then builds a partial
histogram based on the ranges of the given queries. This histogram only in-
cludes the involved areas in the given workload. That approach shrinks the
size of the produced histogram because instead of considering all the attributes’
values we only need to involve the given ranges that are much fewer than the
attributes’ values. Since the proposed mechanism adapts the noise to the given
workload’s ranges, we can build and partition the histogram at the same time
using the given queries’ ranges instead of first building the histogram and then
partitioning it. The ranges of the given queries are extracted firstly, and then
the ranges of each attribute are intersected to generate a set of disjoint ranges.
This process ensures that there are no overlapping areas of the data distribu-
tion involved in the given workload, preventing using the anonymized responses
to infer private information about any specific area. Thus, the disjoint ranges
of each attribute are the actual partition of the dimension representing that
attribute and each range represents an entry of the private histogram. An ex-
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ample of generating the private responses to a given workload W of two queries
q1, and q2 over the tiny dataset is shown in Table 5.3. The first query asks
about the count of the patients whose age is between 15 and 50, with fewer
than 6 pregnancies. The second query asks about the counts of the patients
aged 40 years or more with more than 3 pregnancies. We would represent q1
and q2 as follows: q1 = {[15,50]; [0,6]}, and q2 = {[40,84]; [4,11]}. Based on these
two queries, we have two ranges over each attribute. Over the age attribute, we
have the ranges [15,50] and [40,84]. Therefore, after intersecting these ranges
we now have three ranges [15,40], [40,50], and [50,84]. Repeating the same pro-
cess over the extracted ranges for the ’Number of Pregnancies’ attribute would
produce these three range [0,4], [4,6], and [6,11]. The next step is to generate
the partitioned histogram using these ranges. The histogram should consider
all possible combinations of the attributes’ values that fall within the gener-
ated ranges. Table 5.3 illustrates the partitioned histogram that has been built
based on the intersected range of each attribute. To answer the given queries
under differential privacy, the counts of the partitioned histogram need to be
anonymized by injecting a small amount of noise to each count. Our mecha-
nism generates the needed amounts of noise from the Laplace distribution to
ensure differential privacy. After anonymizing the histogram frequencies, we
can answer the first query by summing up the counts of record number 1, 2,
4, and 5. The second query also can be answered using the counts of record
number 5, 6, 8, and 9.
Complexity, privacy, and utility
Based on the previous example, our proposed model generated a histogram of 9
records to answer the given workload of two queries, since each attribute was
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1 [15,40] [0,4] 3
2 [15,40] [4,6] 0
3 [15,40] [6,11] 0
4 [40,50] [0,4] 0
5 [40,50] [4,6] 0
6 [40,50] [6,11] 0
7 [50,84] [0,4] 1
8 [50,84] [4,6] 2
9 [50,84] [6,11] 1
partitioned into three buckets. On the other hand, the naive histogram [20]
would have
∏2
i=1 Ti = 70∗ 11 records to answer the same workload over the
same tiny dataset. Even if a data-independent mechanism was used, the com-
plexity would still be worse than our proposed mechanism and the partitioned
histogram would have more than 7∗6 records since it needs to be built based
on the distribution of the underlying dataset.
Unlike data-dependent partitioning mechanisms that consume the privacy
budget to build the required data structure, our partitioning strategy does not
require any information about the underlying dataset. Therefore, we only need
to use the privacy budget while building private histograms when retrieving the
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counts that represent its frequencies. That is, as long as this histogram is built,
the private response of each given query can be retrieved from this histogram.
Our partitioning strategy provides more accurate estimated statistics than
the data-dependent partitioning strategies especially for the multiple-attribute
range queries because, in the case of the data-dependent partitioning, each di-
mension is partitioned according to the uniformity of its frequencies. Therefore,
the estimated count of the involved dimensions would include the total of the es-
timated counts of the involved parts (buckets) of each dimension. Observe that
the beginning or the end of each given range may fall inside one of the partition
buckets; thus the count corresponding to this range would involve extra noise
corresponding to the unwanted values that have been included in that bucket.
On the other hand, since our strategy partitions the data dimensions based on
the given ranges, we are sure that only the exact frequencies will be involved in
the generated response, which provides better utility.
5.5 Conclusion
We presented and analyzed a differential privacy based scheme for protecting
personally identifiable information in critical infrastructure data. As the de-
scribed method does not depend on the underlying dataset, it provides better
privacy guarantees than those provided by several existing data-dependent par-
titioning schemes, especially for multiple-attribute range queries.
To answer the RQ4: How can WPM handle multiple-attribute range
queries?, we extended WPM that is presented in Chapter 3 to be able to handle
the multiple-attribute range queries. Moreover, we provided a solution for the
model complexity to make it suitable for the systems that need to update their
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data periodically.
Future work includes adapting the proposed scheme to handle other kinds of
queries such as range queries over categorical attributes. We also intend to in-
vestigate the effect of increased workload size on overall performance and range
size while ensuring lower error rates. All of these improvements can make dif-
ferential privacy viable in the protection of PII within critical infrastructure
data.
Finally, this work was published in the 2019 IEEE International Symposium





In Chapter 5, we answered the RQ4 by proposing an extension to WPM to han-
dle multiple-attribute range queries. Moreover, we analyzed the utility of the
proposed solution comparing to the current mechanisms that have proposed for
answering range queries. In this chapter, we present the MultiAttribute Dis-
Assembly Mechanism (MADAM), which is an extension to the Workload Parti-
tioning Mechanism. Moreover, we answer the RQ5 by proposing BiMADAM,
which reduces the error to be polylogarithmic in the sensitivity degree of the
issued queries. Additionally, the RQ6 was answered by providing empirical ex-
periments and showing how changing the sizes of the given workloads and the
underlying datasets affects both of the utility and the running time of MADAM
and BiMADAM.
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6.1 The MADAM framework
The proposed mechanism MADAM takes n range queries over a single attribute
or multiple attributes and produces a private vector of counts representing
each query’s answers. MADAM disassembles each dimension of the underly-
ing dataset by intersecting the ranges of all given queries to generate a disjoint
set of ranges that form that dimension. At a high level, MADAM goes through
the following steps to generate the private answers to the received queries:
Step 1: Extract the ranges of each attribute from the given queries such that
for each attribute X there will be a set of ranges RX = [i1, j1], [i2, j2], ...[in, jn].
Step 2: Intersect the extracted ranges and sort them to ensure that they
are not overlapping, which indicates that no more than one range focuses on a
specific set of records; we aim to be sure that each frequency gets a sufficient
amount of noise to hide individuals’ identities. As a result of this step, each
attribute X has a set of intersected ranges RX = [i1, j1], [i2, j2], ...[ik, jk] such
that for each [im, jm] ∈ RX , im ≤ jm and jm < im+1.
Step 3: Use the set of disjoint ranges of each attribute to generate all the
possible combinations of attributes’ ranges, and inject the counts, which satisfy
each combination, with Laplace noise to ensure differential privacy.
Step 4: Use the generated combinations from the previous step with their
differential private counts to derive the answer of each given query.
6.1.1 Privacy and utility in MADAM
Our proposed mechanism MADAM is data independent and does not require
information about the underlying dataset to disassemble the given queries. Un-
like the data dependent partitioning mechanisms [13,22,33,52], MADAM does
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not consume any part of the privacy budget for the preparation stage. As it is
based on the given workload, all needed information about the dataset, such as
the number of attributes and the involved ranges, is obtained from the given
workload. The privacy budget is only used while accessing the data to retrieve
the counts corresponding to the generated combinations in step 3, which en-
hances the utility of the model.
Model privacy is guaranteed by Step 3 because it injects Laplace noise into
each count with scale 1
ε
. The model thus achieves ε-differential privacy since
performing any change over the original dataset by adding or removing one
record affects one count if at least one of the queries’ answers is affected. That
is, if making a single change in the original dataset affects the answer of a query,
only one combination of its ranges can be affected by this change. However,
if more than one query covers one combination, this change should apply to
each query’s answers to guarantee individuals’ privacy. This requirement is
satisfied while generating the differentially private counts of the disassembled
attributes, as described next.
6.1.2 One-dimensional datasets
MADAM answers range queries over a one-dimensional dataset by first identi-
fying the areas of focus from the ranges of the given queries, and then anonymiz-
ing the frequencies that fall in each range separately to ensure individuals’
privacy. For each attribute, MADAM extracts all ranges involved in the given
workload and identifies the overlapping areas by intersecting the given ranges
to generate a set of disjoint ranges, which together form the disassembled di-
mension corresponding to the original dimension.
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Figure 6.1: Three range queries over the counts’ vector of attribute X
For example, Figure 6.1 illustrates how MADAM handles a workload of three
queries: q1 : [2,3], q2 : [4,6], and q3 : [1,6]. The queries q1 and q2 are disjoint
but both of them are covered by query q3. Therefore, MADAM disassembles
the counts’ vector into four disjoint ranges [1,1], [2,3], [4,6], and [7,8]. The an-
swer to query q3 is the sum of the noisy counts corresponding to the first three
disjoint ranges.
For range queries over one-dimensional datasets, MADAM takes the work-
load of range queries W along with the dataset with attribute X , and returns
a set of differentially private answers to the given workload W . MADAM then
disassembles the considered dimension based on the given ranges after ensur-
ing that the ranges are not overlapping. The count corresponding to each area
is then injected with Laplace noise to generate a vector of counts to be used
for answering the given queries. Figure 6.2 illustrates how MADAM disassem-
bles attribute X ’s dimension to generate the differential private answers to the
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Figure 6.2: The disassembled vector produced by MADAM to answer the workload shown in Figure 6.1,
the black nodes represent the counts that form the answer to q3.
workload shown in Figure 6.1.2. Each leaf node stores the estimated count cor-
responding to the sub-range represented by this node. The answer to q3 is the
sum of the counts stored in the black nodes.
The accuracy of each query’s answer depends on the number of the sub-
ranges covered by its overall range. These sub-ranges represent the common
parts of the data distribution that were involved in other given queries. If the





) with high probability; this error was analyzed based on Chan’s analysis
of the sum of Laplacian random variables [13]).
Theorem 6.1.1. The proposed mechanism MADAM for single-attribute range
queries is ε-differential private. For a workload W that involves M common




M)-useful for each query q ∈W .
Proof. As each item of the dataset appears in at most one part (range), chang-
ing one item of the dataset affects at most one noisy count. Thus, injecting
lap(1
ε
) to the count corresponding to each part satisfies ε-differential privacy.
MADAM’s utility is illustrated by observing that each query covers m ranges,
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where 1 ≤ m ≤ M, and M is the number of the disjoint ranges that form the
disassembled vector produced by MADAM. As MADAM injects the count corre-
sponding to each range with lap(1
ε
), the total noisy count corresponding to the
query’s range has m independent Laplacian random variables and hence the





Claim 6.1.1. Memory needed by MADAM to generate the disassembled vector
is O(M) words of memory, where M is the number of the disjoint ranges that
together form the considered dimension.
Proof. After disassembling the given dimension into M parts (each part
represents one of the disjoint ranges generated based on the given workload’s
ranges), MADAM only needs to store the noisy count corresponding to each
range r ∈ M.
6.1.3 Multidimensional datasets
We can extend the idea of the disassembling strategy described in Section 6.1.2
to disassemble the range queries over multidimensional datasets and answer
them privately. As the sizes of multidimensional datasets grow exponentially in
the number of their attributes and their values, we may face a complexity issue
while producing the private answers based on the whole set of attributes even
though our mechanism processes ranges instead of values. Therefore, MADAM
does not require a histogram over the whole dataset; we focus only on the at-
tributes that are involved by the given workload. MADAM extracts the ranges
of each attribute to disassemble, and to ensure individual privacy, consider the
combinations of all ranges to prevent exposure of private data due to relation-
ships between attribute. Each workload has a table storing the noisy counts
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corresponding to its ranges, and query answers are drawn from this table.
Algorithm 3 shows how the frequency table is built for each given workload
based in its ranges. This table ensures that multiple given queries that focus
on a particular area get the same noisy response, even if they were given in
different forms. The frequency table is implemented by a class named BLOCK .
Each object of this class represents a range of the disjoint ranges rec and the
order of the attribute that involves this range. Also, each object must have a list
of the next attribute’s ranges and the dataset file to retrieve the counts when
reaching the leaf nodes. Building the table begins by creating an initial object
that traverses the disjoint ranges of the first attribute and builds a new object
for each one of them. If a new object is created and the attribute of this object
is not the same as the last one, a new object of each range of the next attribute
will be created after updating the parameters to process the next attribute. This
process will continue until the last attribute’s objects are created. The counts
that satisfy the ranges of this object and its ancestors will then be retrieved by
the function findCount, and are anonymized and stored in the count parameter
of this object.
Now assume a given workload W involves queries over two attributes, and
the common ranges of these attributes are {[1−3], [4−5]}, and {[1−2], [3−8]}
respectively. To build the frequency table based on the workload W , MADAM
first builds an initial object and then builds additional objects for each range of
the first attribute {[1−3], [4−5]}. Each object will then build an object for each
range of the second attribute {[1−2], [3−8]}. Since the second attribute is the last
one in this query, the objects of this attribute estimate the counts corresponding
to the series of this object’s range and the ranges of its ancestor stored in the
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pre list. Figure 6.3 illustrates the process of building the frequency table using
this example.
Algorithm 3 Building the frequency table T
1: class BLOCK
2: subBlock ← {}
3: attributeRanges ← None
4: count ← None
5: BLOCK(dF, order, pre, rec, all )
6: //dF : dataset
7: //order : attribute order
8: //pre : previous attributes’ ranges
9: //rec : range that was processed recently
10: //all : the set of disjoint ranges for all attributes
11: if order < size(dF) then
12: attributeRanges ← all[order]
13: for each range ∈ attributeRanges do
14: next ← pre
15: if size(rec)> 0 then
16: next∪ rec
17: n = order+1
18: block ← BLOCK(dF,n,next, range,all)
19: subBlock∪block
20: else
21: f allRange ← pre∪ rec
22: count ← f indCount(dF, f ullRange)
23: count ← count+Lap 1ε
24:
25: end class
To retrieve a query’s answer from the frequency table, the ’SearchTable’ func-
tion was built, as shown in Algorithm 4. The function takes the table T, and the
query q that needs to be answered. The function first searches for the block that
covers the first attribute’s range. When the target block is found, the function
updates the parameter order to point to the next attribute’s range and recalls
itself to find the block that covers this range. When a range covers many blocks,
the function needs to break down this range according to the blocks subBlocks
and then call itself to retrieve the count of each component part. The count of
q’s range in this case would be the sum of the retrieved counts of its parts. The
search function continues searching the table and iterating over its block until
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Figure 6.3: The frequency table built by MADAM to answer a given workload that involves two at-
tributes. The black nodes represent the blocks involved in the answer to query q = {[1−5], [1−2]}
it reaches the leaf nodes. It then returns the count stored in that node. For ex-
ample, Figure 6.3 illustrates the table built by MADAM over two-dimensional
dataset. For the query q = {[1− 5], [1− 2]}, the search function breaks down
the range [1−5] into [1−3] and [4−5]. For each sub-range, the function then
searches to find the block the covers the second attribute’s range [1−2]. There-
fore, the answer to query q is the sum of two blocks’ counts([1−3], [1−2] and
[4−5], [1−2]). The black nodes in Figure 6.3 represent these two blocks.
Theorem 6.1.2. MADAM for multiattribute range queries is ε-differentially pri-
vate. For a workload W that involves c attributes, if each attribute has M com-
mon ranges between the queries of W , MADAM produces Mc noisy counts. There-




Mc)-useful for each query q ∈W .
Proof. Each item in the dataset appears in at most one part (represented
by a combination of ranges) because the ranges of each involved attribute are
disjoint. Performing any change over an item of the dataset affects the count of
at most one combination. Therefore, anonymizing the count of each combination
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Algorithm 4 Extracting counts from the frequency table T
1: procedure SEARCHTABLE(T, q, order)
2: block ← T
3: counts ← []
4: attNo ← order
5: blocksize ← size(block.attributeRanges)
6: blockrngs ← block.attributeRanges
7: if attNo < size(q) then
8: rngq ← q[attNo]
9: for index = 0 : blocksize do
10: rng ← blockrngs[index]
11: if rngq[0]== rng[0] then
12: if rngq[1]== rng[1] then
13: attNo ← attNo+1
14: blck = block.subBlock[index]
15: cnt ← SearchTable(blck, q,attNo)
16: return cnt
17: else
18: j ← index
19: pin ← rng[1]
20: blck ← block.subBlock[ j]
21: while pin ≤ rngq[1] do
22: nxt = attNo+1
23: cnt ← SearchTable(blck, q,nxt)
24: counts∪ cnt
25: j ← j+1
26: if j < blocksize then
27: subrng ← blockrngs[ j]
28: blck ← block.subBlock[ j]
29: pin ← subrng[1]
30: else
31: break
32: blockcnt ← sum(counts)
33: return blockcnt
34: else




) satisfies ε-differential privacy.
For the utility of MADAM, if a workload W has c attributes and each one of
them involves M disjoint ranges, the generated table would have Mc combina-
tions. Observe that each query’s answers is obtained by summing the counts of
L blocks where 1 ≤ L ≤ Mc. Since the mechanism injects the count correspond-
ing to each combination by lap(1
ε
), the total noisy count corresponding to each
query has L independent Laplacian random variables and thus the error will
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Mc), according to Chan [13].
Claim 6.1.2. MADAM can be implemented in O(Mc) words of memory.
Proof. For multiattribute range queries, if a given workload W involves c at-
tributes, MADAM builds a table to store the noisy counts that satisfy the com-
binations of the ranges given by W . The table contains
∏c
i=1 Mi combinations,
where M represents the number of the disjoint ranges for attribute i. Thus, the
generated table stores Mc noisy counts.
Table 6.1: Utility comparison: Binary Mechanism, MADAM, and BiMADAM










Error O( 1ε .(logT)
1.5d ) O( 1ε .
p
Mc) O( 1ε .(log M)
1.5c)
T: dimension size
d: number of dimensions
M: number of disjoint ranges, M ≤ T
c: number of involved attributes, c ≤ d
6.2 Extending MADAM to BiMADAM
MADAM’s power can be illustrated by showing how it can be extended to work
for aggregated queries that involve large numbers of disjoint ranges, which
are used in common queries by data researchers. We extend MADAM into
a variant called BiMADAM to reduce the error for the aggregated queries.
For illustration, consider the following example with five queries: q1 : [1−2],
q2 : [3−4,q3 : [5−6], q4 : [7−10] and q5 : [1−10]. As q5 involves four ranges,
MADAM’s usage would result in a response that contains noise proportional to
4. However, if we were to use BiMADAM (as discussed below), the response
would result in noise proportional to the logarithm of 4.
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Guided by the Binary Mechanism [13] and the Tree Counter [22], the com-
binations of attributes’ ranges can be represented as a binary tree that stores
the noisy counts within its nodes. The private responses of the given queries
can then be retrieved from this tree. The naïve binary trees can be built on top
of single values, thus our tree requires fewer computational resources, as the
number of the disjoint ranges that form a particular domain is smaller than the
number of its distinct values.
Dwork et al. [22] proposed a similar approach by partitioning attributes’ val-
ues domains and building a binary tree on top of that. As partitioning is per-
formed without taking the ranges of the given workload into account, we expect
the error to be higher as the start or the end of a given range may fall inside
one of the partition’s intervals. That is, the estimated count of the given range
involves the estimated count of the whole part which covers other unwanted
values. Our approach guarantees that the estimated count of any given range
only involves the noisy counts corresponding to that range. Building a binary
tree over the attribute ranges thus makes the variance of the injected noise to
the real answers polylogarithmic to the number of the involved disjoint ranges,
which is smaller than the number of involved entries. Table 6.1 shows how the
error can be minimized using BiMADAM compared to the Binary Mechanism,
as the number of the involved attributes c is smaller than the number of all
attributes d.
6.2.1 BiMADAM for one-dimensional datasets
BiMADAM uses sorted disjoint ranges to ensure the binary tree is precisely
built. Each range is a leaf in the tree, and at any height h each node covers 2h
ranges. If the total number of ranges is M, then the height of the binary tree is
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Figure 6.4: The binary tree built by BiMADAM to store the counts within the range [1-10], the estimated
count corresponding to the range [1,7] is obtained by adding the noisy counts stored inside the the black
nodes.
log M. Inside each internal node, BiMADAM stores the noisy counts correspond-
ing to a set of ranges covered by this node. For example, as shown in Figure 6.4,
if BiMADAM takes a set of disjoint ranges RX = {[1,2], [3,5], [6,7], [8,10]}, the
binary tree would have four leaves to store the noisy count corresponding to
each range in RX . The height of the tree is log4.
The estimated count corresponding to the range [1,7] can be obtained by
summing the noisy counts stored inside the black nodes in the tree because
according to the binary tree, the range [1,7] can be broken down into [1,5], and
[6,7]. On the other hand, if we use MADAM as represented in Section 6.1.2 for
the same set of ranges, the estimated value of range [1,7] involves three disjoint
ranges instead of two. As a result, BiMADAM provides better utility with the
same guarantee of privacy.
BiMADAM injects the counts stored inside each node with noise of variance
Θ(log M). The expected error of the produced result corresponding to a given
range is reduced to roughly O(1
ε




M) for the original
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version of MADAM.
Theorem 6.2.1. BiMADAM for Single attribute range queries is ε-differentially
private. For a workload W that involves M common ranges between its queries,
the mechanism is O(1
ε
).O(log M)1.5-useful for each query q ∈W .
Proof. For the binary tree that is built over M ranges, each item of the dataset
appears in at most log M nodes of the tree. Therefore, performing any change
over one of the data item affects at most log M counts. Injecting the counts
corresponding to each range with lap(1
ε
) makes the mechanism O(log M).ε- dif-
ferentially private. As BiMADAM adds Laplace noise from lap( log M
ε
), it is ε-
differentially private.
For BiMADAM’s usefulness over one-dimensional datasets, observe that each
range given by a query can be disassembled into O(log M) ranges. The estimated
count of each given range involves O(log M) random variables. As BiMADAM
generates noise with Θ(log M) variance, any given query can be answered with
error bounded to O(1
ε
).O(log M)1.5.
6.2.2 BiMADAM for multidimensional datasets
For multidimensional datasets, the binary tree is multidimensional and the con-
struction process is performed over the ranges of each attribute. The ranges of
each attribute are processed independently to ensure that they are not over-
lapped. The construction of the multidimensional binary tree is established
over the first attribute. In this case, the ranges of the first attribute are formed
similarly to the ranges in the binary tree over single attribute described in Sec-
tion 6.2.1. The nodes of this tree contain a binary tree, called a "branch tree".
Additionally, each node of the kth branch tree stores a noisy count correspond-
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Figure 6.5: An example of a BiMADAM tree over 2-dimensional dataset
ing to the ranges covered by its ancestor nodes from the trees 1, ...,k−1. For
example, if a given workload involves two attributes X and Y , if their disjoint
ranges are {[1,3], [4,5]} and {[1,5], [3,8]} (respectively), the multidimensional bi-
nary tree over these attributes is illustrated in Figure 6.5. The gray nodes
represent the counts of attribute X in addition to being a parent of the next
binary tree over attribute Y . The gray nodes store the counts of the instances
that fall in a specified ranges for the first attribute X and the full ranges of
the next attribute Y . For example, for the query that involves the full ranges
of both attributes ([1,5], [1,8]), the noisy count is stored in the root node([1,5]).
The striped node contains the estimated count corresponding to the ranges [4,5]
and [1,2] for attribute X and Y respectively.
Even though the entire tree and its branches are not released, the user may
still be able to make connections between the provided results and construct
some parts of the trees. Thus, all of the attributes’ trees must be considered
while releasing any count corresponding to some of its parts. To ensure data
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privacy, the count stored inside each node is injected with noise of variance
Θ(logc M). The expected error for a given multiattribute range query is thus re-
duced to roughly O(1
ε
. log1.5c M) compared to O(1
ε
. log1.5d T) stated by Chan [13]
observing that M, which is the maximum number of the disjoint ranges of the
attributes, is much smaller than the domain size T, and the number of the in-
volved attributes c is smaller than the number of all attributes d.
Theorem 6.2.2. BiMADAM for multiattribute range queries is ε-differentially
private. For a workload W that involves c attributes, if M is the maximum
number of disjoint ranges of any attribute involved by W , the mechanism is
O(1
ε
).O(log M)1.5c-useful for each query q ∈W .
Proof. For the binary tree of trees that is built over the attributes’ ranges,
if M is the maximum number of the disjoint ranges representing any one of
the involved attributes, then each item of the dataset appears in at most log M
nodes of each tree (branch tree). Therefore, performing any change over one
of the data items affects at most logc M counts. Thus, injecting each node’s
count with an independent Laplace noise lap( log
c M
ε
) makes BiMADAM over
multiattribute datasets ε- differentially private.
For BiMADAM’s usefulness over multidimensional datasets, observe that for
a given query, each range over one attribute can be disassembled into O(log M)
ranges. Thus the ranges of a given query over c attributes can be disassem-
bled into O(logc M) ranges. The estimated answer of each given query involves
O(logc M) random variables, and by considering the variance of the generat-
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6.3 Comparative analysis
A comparative analysis of MADAM and BiMADAM with the Binary Mecha-
nism [13] is provided in this section. The binary mechanism was chosen as it
is the most closely related mechanism in the literature. For our experiments,
we used a real dataset, with 858 records, of patients who were diagnosed with
cervical cancer [25]. We used three columns from this dataset; age, number of
partners, and number of pregnancies. The number of distinct values for each
attribute are 72, 28, and 12 respectively. Additionally, we generated two sim-
ulated datasets that have three attributes. The first dataset has 30 distinct
values for each attribute while the second dataset has 10 distinct values for
each attribute. The workloads were generated randomly based on their sizes.
For each workload, the common ranges of its queries are extracted to generate
the number of the possible combinations that we used to compare the error and
the computation time for each mechanism. For example, if a given workload
involves two disjoint ranges for the first attribute, three disjoint ranges for the
second attribute, and four disjoint ranges for the third attribute, the number of
the involved combinations in that workload is 2*3*4.
6.3.1 Utility of range queries
To measure the utility of the mechanisms being evaluated, the absolute error
was calculated for each query’s response. Specifically, the absolute error of a
produced response r is defined as |r−t|, where t is the true response to the given
query. The average of the absolute error of the workload’s queries is calculated
to measure the utility of the produced response to the given workload. During
all of these experiments, the parameter ε is set to be 1.0, and the three mecha-
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Figure 6.6: The average absolute error over the patients’ dataset
nisms are run simultaneously to respond to the same workload. The error was
then calculated over each produced response.
The first phase of the experiment was performed over the patient dataset,
and the average of the absolute error of the obtained responses is shown in
Figure 6.6. For each generated workload, the number of possible combina-
tions is calculated to monitor its effect on the utility of the produced responses.
The results in Figure 6.6 show that BiMADAM produced more accurate re-
sponses than the Binary Mechanism, as the number of the combinations be-
comes smaller, and both mechanisms behaved similarly as the number of the
combinations became closer to the worst case, i.e., when all the distinct values
is considered while generating the differentially private responses.
On the other hand, even in the worst case, MADAM produces more accu-
rate responses compared to the other mechanisms. We obtained similar re-
sults while testing the three mechanisms over the simulated dataset that has
30 distinct values for each attribute, as shown in Figure 6.7. The similarities
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Figure 6.7: Average absolute error over a 3-dimensional simulated datasets that has 30 distinct value
for each attribute
between the obtained results over different datasets indicates that the three
mechanisms are data-independent and their accuracy is not affected by the dis-
tribution of the underlying dataset. The results in both figures indicate that
only the nature of the given workload affects result accuracy, as the error of
all mechanisms goes up and down together while answering the same given
workload.
The second phase of our experiment tested the effect of the workload sizes
and the number of the instances within the underlying dataset on the accuracy
of the produced results. Figure 6.8 shows that increasing the workload size does
not affect accuracy in any of the three mechanisms, and MADAM maintains the
same accuracy level as the other mechanisms.
To study the effect of dataset size, all three mechanisms were used to answer
a large workload that involves all possible combinations of attribute values, as
the Binary Mechanism would handle this case even if the given workload was
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extremely small. The experiment was repeated for several sizes of the under-
lying dataset. For this task, we used a 3-dimensional dataset with 10 distinct
values for each attribute. Figure 6.9 shows that as we increase the size of the
underlying dataset the average absolute error fluctuates because we consider
the worst case, involving accumulated error for each given workload. Also, as
the size of the underlying dataset decreases, the negative values of the added
noise do not have an impact because the counts are small and the negative
counts are rounded to zero. Therefore, the error grows with the increasing size
of the underlying dataset.
Despite changes in utility levels, experimental results show that MADAM
preserves better utility than the Binary Mechanism and BiMADAM.
The worst case scenario, when a given workload has an aggregated query
that cover many areas involved by other queries, was considered in our exper-
iment as well. We measured the utility of the mechanisms by monitoring the
queries that have the maximum error compared to the other queries given by
the same workload. Figure 6.10 shows the changes in the maximum error based
on the number of the involved counts in the produced responses. The obtained
results show that even in these cases MADAM maintains a similar level of util-
ity compared to BiMADAM and the Binary mechanism, and its utility becomes
worse when the number of the involved counts become significantly high which
is unlike to accrue in the normal situations. So, considering the computational
resource consumed by each mechanism, MADAM is more practical for dynamic
datasets since it consumes lower resources.
85
CHAPTER 6. THE MULTIATTRIBUTE DISASSEMBLY MECHANISM
Figure 6.8: The effects of changing workloads’ sizes on the average absolute error
6.3.2 Computation time
Our experiment also considered the time needed by each mechanism to return
the given queries’ responses. We included both the time needed to build the data
structure for storing the estimated counts and to extract query responses from
that structure. The total computation time for each mechanism is thus the sum
of these two times. In the first phase of this evaluation, the total time for each
mechanism was measured based on the number of the involved combinations
by the given workloads. Figure 6.11 shows the changes in time in seconds for
each mechanism based on changes of the involved combinations. Noticeably,
MADAM was faster than the Binary Mechanism or BiMADAM, thus making
it more suitable for dynamic datasets. As BiMADAM depends on the involved
combinations, it should only be used for dynamic datasets when utility matters
more than performance.
The time needed to build the required data structure by MADAM and Bi-
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Figure 6.9: The effects of dataset’s size (number of instances) on the models’ utility
MADAM is affected by the number of the dimensions being considered and
their size. We therefore tested the effect of workload size on the time needed
to extract the results from the differentially private structure, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.12. Even though the time needed to extract the results grew for all of
the tested mechanisms as the workload size grew, the time needed to extract
the results by all mechanisms did not exceed that of the largest workload gen-
erated during the testing process. All changes in computation time for each
mechanism are due to the time needed to build the data structure that stores
the noisy counts.
Figure 6.13 illustrates how the running time was measured based on the
dataset size (number of tuples). The obtained results indicate that changing
the number of tuples does not have a major effect on the time required by each
mechanism to return an answer to a given workload. MADAM maintains its
performance regardless of changes in the number of the included tuples. The
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Figure 6.10: The maximum error based on the number of involved counts in the produced response
figure also shows that the Binary Mechanism and BiMADAM both consume
almost the same period of time because our test is based on a workload involving
all possible combinations of the attributes’ values.
6.3.3 Discussion
The results from our analysis demonstrate MADAM’s effectiveness for dynamic
datasets as the time to process responses to the given workloads is reasonable
as compared to the Binary Mechanism and BiMADAM. Moreover, the aver-
age absolute error of MADAM was considerably lower for the random sets of
queries, even though the theoretical analysis predicts that the Binary Mecha-
nism would achieve lower error. The theoretical analysis, however, is the worst
case scenario that occurs when the size of the underlying dataset is very large
and the given workload involves all possible combinations. In this case, using
the Binary Mechanism for more accurate responses becomes costly, making this
mechanism unusable for dynamic datasets. The proposed BiMADAM is useful
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Figure 6.11: The time consumed by each mechanism over patients’ dataset
Figure 6.12: The effects of changing workloads’ sizes on the time needed to extract the results
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Figure 6.13: The effects of datasets’ sizes on computation time
because of the binary tree structure that minimizes complexity by only consider-
ing the involved attributes and their ranges. In the interactive setting, we make
the assumption that a user is unlikely to ask about every possible value of each
attribute. Moreover, non-malicious analytical requests typically focus on large
fractions of the underlying dataset, which reduce the considered attributes and
their values, and allow for more accurate estimations.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we attempted to extend WPM to answer the RQ5: How can the
efficiency of WPM over the multi-dimensional datasets be improved?.
So, we proposed MADAM, an online ε-differential private mechanism for mul-
tiattribute range queries. Compared to existing solutions, we have shown theo-
retically and empirically that MADAM provides significantly tighter error while
providing private answers for given workloads of range queries. We also dis-
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cussed its useful and performant extension, BiMADAM, that was proposed to
improve the utility of MADAM while handling large aggregated queries.
This chapter also provides the answers to the RQ6: How do the sizes of
workloads affect the accuracy of WPM results?. We conducted an imperial
study to test the effects of workloads’ sizes on the models’ utility and complexity.
Further, the obtained results demonstrate the effectiveness of MADAM since it
maintains better utility and less computational times as the sizes of the given




This chapter summarizes the research tasks that were addressed throughout
this dissertation and discusses future research directions.
7.1 Current Status
This dissertation investigated different partitioning strategies to answer range
queries while satisfying differential privacy. Our analysis of the most relevant
mechanisms for range queries led to the proposed Workload Partitioning Mech-
anism (WPM) that ensures improved privacy guarantees while keeping com-
plexity costs down.
The dissertation also demonstrated how WPM can be combined with access
control both to improve the security of real-world systems and to ensure they
preserve data privacy. Furthermore, the dissertation presented an extension of
WPM to handle multiple-attribute range queries with analyses of complexity,
utility, and privacy of the proposed extension.
The dissertation then identified the factors that impact the complexity and
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utility of WPM, proposing MADAM that can achieve less complexity and Bi-
MADAM that can answer aggregated queries (the worst case) more accurately.
7.2 Future Work
This dissertation proposed novel mechanisms for answering range queries un-
der differential privacy without restricting the number of the given queries or
the type of the underlying dataset. The conducted evaluations of these mech-
anisms motivate several areas worthy for further exploration. We summarize
some of these areas next.
Automate the usage of MADAM and BiMADAM
The empirical evaluations of MADAM verified its effectiveness as a workload-
aware mechanism while being suitable for dynamic datasets, but it may have an
accuracy issue that can be avoided by using BiMADAM. Therefore, automating
the usage of both mechanism could be a good solution to take the advantages of
each mechanism while avoiding their issues.
Based on the obtained results, the nature of the given workload affect the
accuracy of the produced results. For example, the workloads that involve nor-
mal queries can be answered more accurate than the ones that involve sensi-
tive queries. Also, aggregated queries can be answered more accurately if the
given workload does not involve queries that target the same areas covered by
these aggregated queries. Therefore, this task can be achieved by evaluating
the given workloads and choosing the more suitable mechanism based on the
nature of their queries.
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Conduct wider theoretical analyses of MADAM
The theoretical analyses of MADAM show that there is an accuracy issue while
answering aggregated queries. However, the empirical evaluation of MADAM
while answering aggregated queries show that MADAM’s results are as accu-
rate as the results of the Binary Mechanism and BiMADAM, and they only
become worse for large workloads. Therefore, further studies are needed to
discover when does this issue accrue, and what is the characteristics of these
workloads that contribute to the inaccurate answers because discovering these
factors would be helpful in improving MADAM’s utility.
Enhance BiMADAM’s efficiency
Although the conducted theoretical analyses show that BiMADAM achieves
lower error than MADAM, BiMADAM has a complexity issue because of the
binary tree that consume more time and spaces as they grow. So, there is a
need for a solution to overcome this issue while maintaining the same level of
utility. A possible way to achieve that is by reducing the binary tree by pruning
the branches from the nodes that have low counts. However, this solution needs
to be tested rigorously to verify its effectiveness and define its requirements and
limitations.
Parallel computations will help to speed up building the binary tree and re-
trieving the counts from its nodes. Experimenting with this solution may be
able to show how the parallelization could contribute to enhance BiMADAM’s
efficiency, and identify the factors that play significant roles of achieving that.
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Perform wider studies of different types of hierarchical repre-
sentations
Changing the data structure representation could make significant differences
in the accuracy of the the produced results. However, that requires changing
noise magnitudes to satisfy ε-differential privacy that may affect the accuracy
adversely. Therefore, trying different representations of the deferentially pri-
vate data structure may contribute to answer the given range queries more
efficiently. This task needs to be paired with deep analyses and rigorous testing
to design robust mechanisms that can switch between different representations
and adjust the noise based on that. This task is one of our research goals for
the future.
Answer counting queries over categorical attributes
Range queries are among the most powerful kinds of queries for analytical anal-
yses. As it is rare to find a real dataset that only have numerical attributes,
categorical attributes can also be used to build statistical learning models and
used to identify individuals easily. Thus, it is really important to improve the
proposed mechanisms to handle both numerical and categorical attributes to
enable more robust analyses while ensuring individuals’ privacy.
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